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A COLLABORATIVE MODEL OF OFFSHORE 
LEGAL OUTSOURCING 
Cassandra Burke Robertson∗ 
International outsourcing has come to the legal profession. The ABA and 
other bar associations have given it their stamp of approval, and an ailing 
economy has pushed both clients and firms to consider sending more legal 
work abroad. This article integrates research from the fields of 
organizational behavior, social psychology, and economic theory to analyze 
the effectiveness of the legal outsourcing relationship. It identifies 
organizational pressures in the practice of law that affect how legal work is 
performed in a transnational context, and it examines how individuals on 
both sides of the outsourcing process influence the success or failure of a 
globalized practice. Ultimately, the article recommends that parties 
involved in legal offshoring should move away from a model of 
disaggregation and toward a model of collaboration. Unlike a 
disaggregation model that assumes outsourcing vendors will autonomously 
complete discrete legal tasks, a collaborative model would explicitly focus 
on cooperation, communication, and renegotiation of status and resources.  
INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2010, the dismissal of a libel case involving Sacha Baron 
Cohen’s “Ali G” character was affirmed on appeal.1 By itself, the dismissal 
was nothing unusual; Cohen’s comedic style has made him a target for 
defamation lawsuits arising from the films Borat, Bruno, and the television 
                                                                                                                            
∗ Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to 
Sanjay Bhatia, Troy Brown, Kevin Colangelo, Tiffani Darden, Michelle Harner, Jacqueline 
Lipton, Larry Martin, Andrew Pollis, William Rhee, Carole Silver, Matthew Sullivan, David 
Wilkins, and participants in the Ohio Legal Scholarship Workshop, the Michigan State 
University College of Law Junior Faculty Workshop, and the International Legal Ethics 
Conference IV for their valuable input and suggestions. Jeremy Schirra provided outstanding 
research assistance. 
1. Doe v. Channel Four Television Corp., No. B217145, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
2468, at *1, *11, *23 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2010).  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1705505
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show Da Ali G Show.2 Cohen’s domestic broadcaster twice settled libel 
suits based on an Ali G skit3—a typical litigation strategy when the cost of a 
nuisance settlement is cheaper than paying to defend against a meritless 
claim.4 But when the U.K. distributor was sued in California over the same 
skit,5 it decided to handle the suit differently. Rather than spending a great 
deal of money defending the claim—or agreeing to settle for a fee less than 
the cost of a traditional defense—the defendant outsourced its defense to an 
Indian firm associated with the defendant’s U.S. counsel.6 The Indian firm 
drafted a motion for summary judgment, which was filed by an associated 
                                                                                                                            
2. See, e.g., Palestinian Files Libel Suit Over “Bruno”, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Dec. 9, 
2009, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/palestinian-files-libel-suit-bruno-
92191. 
3. Leigh Holmwood, Ali G: US Judge Throws Out Woman’s $800,000 Libel Claim, 
GUARDIAN UK, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/apr/22/ali-g-
libel-win; see also Channel Four Television Corp., 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2468, at *4–
5 (noting that HBO had settled for $40,000 in 2004 and settled for $50,000 in 2006). 
4. Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1576 (1996) 
(“Frivolous claims often yield nuisance settlements, which represent nothing more than the 
nuisance value of the suit—the expense, harassment, and embarrassment that the defendant may 
endure in defending the suit. These nuisance settlements provide enough of an incentive for 
plaintiffs to pursue them and, therefore, for investors to invest in them.”). 
5. The California court described the skit in question as follows: 
Ali G interviewed Gore Vidal (Vidal) regarding the United States 
Constitution and Amendments thereto. In the course of that discussion, Ali G 
referred to appellant by her full name, stating: “Ain’t it better sometimes, to 
get rid of the whole thing rather than amend it [the Constitution]? Cos like 
me used to go out with this bitch called [appellant’s name] and she used to 
always trying [to] amend herself. Y’know, get her hair done in highlights, get 
like tattoo done on her batty crease, y’know, have the whole thing shaved—
very nice but it didn’t make any more difference. She was still a minger and 
so, y’know me had enough and once me got her pregnant me said alright, 
laters, that is it. Ain’t it the same with the Constitution?” During the episode, 
Ali G also stated that Vidal was a world famous hairstylist and that the 
Constitution was written on two stone tablets with Moses’s involvement. In 
other portions of the same episode Ali G stated that Denzel Washington lived 
in George Washington’s former Mount Vernon home; that John Paul Jones 
had no arms or legs; that the world is running out of gravity, which was 
discovered by “Sir Isaac Newton-John” after shooting an apple from William 
Tell’s head; that euthanasia means the killing of elderly people by youth in 
Asia; and that Ali G’s face was added to Mount Rushmore. 
Channel Four Television Corp., 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2468, at *3–4. The court agreed 
with the district court’s conclusion that “the statements could not reasonably be understood as 
statements of fact.” Id. at *7. 
6. SDD Global Helps Win Unanimous California Appellate Victory in “Ali G” Libel 
Case, SDD GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, http://www.sddglobal.com/legal-outsourcing-lpo-legal-
process-outsourcing-news.htm#Ali_G (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  
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U.S. attorney and ultimately granted by a Los Angeles judge.7 The Indian 
firm also drafted briefs defending the decision on appeal and won a 
unanimous ruling sustaining the case’s dismissal.8 
The Ali G case demonstrates some of the complexities of legal 
offshoring. Offshoring the defense in that case did not merely replace 
domestic legal services with a lower-cost alternative elsewhere; instead, it 
changed the nature of the defense entirely. It took a case that would likely 
have been handled outside the court system through a nuisance settlement 
and brought it within the formal adjudicatory system. As a result, the case 
was decided on the merits and the decision is publicly available, potentially 
discouraging further meritless claims. 
While the Ali G case shows that international outsourcing can transform 
individual lawsuits, it also demonstrates how outsourcing is quickly 
becoming a part of mainstream legal practice. Clients who experiment with 
outsourcing tend to continue their contracts and institutionalize the 
practice.9 SDD Global’s success in the Ali G litigation was one example of 
this phenomenon, as it led to a longer term relationship between the 
offshore firm and Sacha Baron Cohen’s onshore legal team.10 Among other 
work, the Indian firm researched local defamation and obscenity rulings of 
jurisdictions in which the comedian planned to film scenes for the movie 
Bruno.11 
Given the rapid growth of transnational legal outsourcing—and the large 
cost-savings associated with that growth—it seems safe to say that 
outsourcing is not going away anytime soon. The legal profession will have 
to adapt to incorporate this new way of providing legal services. A number 
of recent articles12 and student notes13 have looked at the ethical 
                                                                                                                            
7. See id.; Channel Four Television Corp., 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2468, at *1, 
*6–8. 
8. See Channel Four Television Corp., 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2468, at *1, *6–8; 
SDD GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, supra note 6. 
9. Approximately 70% of outsourcing contracts are renewed after fulfillment of the 
initial contract. Charles Christian, Rumpole of Mumbai—PwC LPO/Outsourcing Survey, THE 
ORANGE RAG (Jan. 15, 2010, 3:57 PM), http://www.theorangerag.com/blog/_archives/ 
2010/1/15/4429192.html. 
10. Interview with Sanjay Bhatia, Head of Operations, SDD Global (June 18, 2010). 
11. Id. 
12. Steven C. Bennett, The Ethics of Legal Outsourcing, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 479 (2009); 
Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening the World of Legal Services? The Ethical and 
Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal and Law-Related Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 401 
(2007); Carlo D’Angelo, Overseas Legal Outsourcing and the American Legal Profession: 
Friend or “Flattener”?, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 167 (2008); Brandon James Fischer, 
Outsourcing Legal Services, In-Sourcing Ethical Issues: An Examination of the Ethical 
Considerations Arising From the Practice of Outsourcing Legal Services Abroad, 16 SW. J. 
INT’L L. 451 (2010); James I. Ham, Ethical Considerations Relating to Outsourcing of Legal 
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implications of international outsourcing, addressing issues such as the 
supervision of foreign legal professionals, confidentiality, and competence. 
But very little research has been done into how socioeconomics, 
organizational structure and social psychology influence lawyers in the 
outsourcing process as they attempt to comply with these duties.14 The 
organizational setting is important, however; research has repeatedly shown 
that the social and organizational factors significantly influence behavior.15 
This article seeks to bridge that gap in the literature by analyzing legal 
outsourcing through the lens of organizational and socioeconomic theory 
and by giving attention to situational influences affecting the outsourcing 
process. This analysis can shed light on the practices and structures needed 
to ensure compliance with ethical duties in the outsourcing context. 
Part I examines the current—and rapidly developing—practice of 
international contracting for legal services. In it, I examine the financial 
incentives that led to the growth of legal outsourcing, the mechanics of the 
outsourcing process, and the current level of client satisfaction.  
Part II offers an overview of standard theories from economics, 
organizational behavior, and social psychology. It explains how these 
theories illuminate parties’ differing incentives in the contracting process. 
Understanding how parties react to different incentives—at both a rational 
                                                                                                                            
Services by Law Firms to Foreign Service Providers: Perspectives from the United States, 27 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 323 (2008); Aaron R. Harmon, The Ethics of Legal Process 
Outsourcing—Is the Practice of Law a “Noble Profession,” or Is It Just Another Business?, 13 
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 41 (2008); Lee A. Patterson, Outsourcing of Legal Services: A Brief Survey 
of the Practice and the Minimal Impact of Protectionist Legislation, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & 
BUS. 177 (2008); Mark L. Tuft, Supervising Offshore Outsourcing of Legal Services in a Global 
Environment: Re-Examining Current Ethical Standards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 825 (2010). 
13. Jose A. Arambulo, Comment, O Where, O Where Has My Legal Job Gone?: 
Examining the Realities of “Offshoring” Legal Work and Why States Can Regulate the Practice 
Despite Congress’ Broad Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause¸ 38 SW. L. REV. 195 
(2008); Joshua A. Bachrach, Note, Offshore Legal Outsourcing and Risk Management: 
Proposing Prospective Limitation of Liability Agreements Under Model Rule 1.8(H), 21 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 631 (2008); Alexandra Hanson, Comment, Legal Process Outsourcing to India: 
So Hot Right Now!, 62 SMU L. REV. 1889 (2009); Courtney I. Schultz, Note, Legal Offshoring: 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 35 J. CORP. L. 639 (2010); Keith Weffinden, Comment, Surfing the 
Next Wave of Outsourcing: The Ethics of Sending Domestic Legal Work to Foreign Countries 
Under New York City Opinion 2006-3, 2007 BYU L. REV. 483 (2007). 
14. One notable exception is Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains 
and Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 
2184 (2010) (examining the economic theory behind disaggregation of legal services and 
analyzing empirical work on outsourcing, both across industries and within the legal 
profession). 
15. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 
154 (2003). 
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level and at an unconscious psychological level—can help predict where 
risks will arise in the process.  
Part III looks beyond the contracting process to examine the situational 
context of outsourcing arrangements and identify risks that arise from gaps 
in the allocation of responsibility or from cultural misunderstandings. It 
looks at the most common models for allocating responsibility within the 
outsourcing relationship, and it examines how the employment conditions 
of outsourcing professionals influence the quality of legal services rendered. 
It also analyzes cultural and status barriers that can impair the effectiveness 
of the outsourcing relationship.  
Finally, Part IV recommends a shift in framework from an outsourcing 
model of disaggregation to one of collaboration. Under a traditional 
disaggregation model, each participant is expected to work autonomously, 
thus leaving significant gaps in the chain of responsibility and incentives for 
opportunistic behavior. Under the collaborative model I propose, by 
contrast, participants would actively focus on cooperation, communication, 
and negotiation of status and resources. This collaborative focus would help 
close the gaps in the chain of responsibility, facilitating compliance with 
ethical duties and improving the quality of the legal services rendered. 
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF LEGAL OFFSHORING 
Because legal offshoring is such a new part of the legal services 
landscape, it is unfamiliar to most Americans—even to most lawyers. They 
may have trouble picturing how the offshoring arrangements are made and 
how the work is actually done. And indeed, the answers to both of these 
questions are rapidly changing and differ significantly depending on who is 
sending the work and who is contracting to perform it. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to get a sense of how the process works in general and some of the 
various options available to parties seeking to take advantage of offshoring 
arrangements. This section provides an overview of current international 
outsourcing practices, examining who sends legal work offshore, what types 
of legal work are sent, and the perceived benefits and detriments of this 
global labor arbitrage.  
A. The Genesis of Legal Process Outsourcing 
Transnational legal process outsourcing grew out of more general 
business and information technology outsourcing. Information technology 
outsourcing, especially to India, grew dramatically in the 1990s. Companies 
needed to retrofit their software to avoid the so-called “millennium bug” or 
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“Y2K problem,” in order to avoid software failures from failing to program 
dates with a four-digit year.16 United States companies ultimately spent 
around $100 billion preparing for Y2K.17 Given the huge expense of re-
writing the software code, many companies looked for ways to save 
money.18 India proved to have capable, low-cost programmers and software 
professionals who could do the work quickly, and the growth of the Internet 
and communications technologies in the 1990s made it possible to 
collaborate globally on software projects.19 As a result, Indian firms booked 
billions of dollars in business from American companies.20  
After the turn of the millennium, global outsourcing did not end—
instead, it picked up steam.21 The success of the Y2K efforts established a 
paradigm for international collaboration. It was a classic example of a 
“temporary economic shock that produces a permanent change.”22 
Based on the success of the software model, firms began outsourcing 
other types of work to India. Technology firms in particular began to 
outsource more general business, seeing a growth in what was called 
“business process outsourcing” or “BPO.”23 The “process” in the phrase 
refers to the idea “there is delegation of ‘control over the process’ which 
implies that the supplier becomes the ‘owner of the business process.’”24 
Typical business process outsourcing might include payroll processing or 
employee benefits management.25  
Soon, businesses began to offshore ever-more-complex processes. Those 
requiring the greatest expertise and skill were known as “knowledge 
process outsourcing” or “KPO.”26 So, for example, while BPO might 
require a vendor to perform data entry of insurance claims forms, KPO 
might require the vendor to “evaluate new insurance applications based on a 
                                                                                                                            
16. Farhad Manjoo, Apocalypse Then: Was Y2K a Waste?, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://www.slate.com/id/ 2235357/entry/2235359. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. SHASHI SHEKHAR PANDEY, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGAL PROCESS OUTSOURCING 
6–7 (2009). 
24. Id. at 6. 
25. BPO—What Is Business Process Outsourcing?, SOURCINGMAG.COM, 
http://www.sourcingmag.com/content/what_is_bpo.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
26. Id. 
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set of criteria or business rules.”27 Technology has brought outsourcing 
options even to specialized fields such as medicine28 and law.  
Legal process outsourcing, or “LPO,” arose from KPO and operates as a 
specialized form of KPO occurring in the legal field.29 It benefited from 
fortuitous timing and the intersection of two trends. Just as technological 
and business outsourcing grew in the past two decades, the legal field 
changed at the same time, as law firms and clients began to rely more and 
more on temporary and contract workers.30 Legal work was increasingly 
outsourced onshore to staffing agencies or to specialized e-discovery 
agencies.31 Offshore outsourcing combined these trends, taking work that 
might have been given to a temporary attorney or an e-discovery vendor, 
and sending it to be performed abroad. 
B. The Variety of Legal Offshoring Work 
Just as the millennium bug sparked an increase in technology offshoring, 
the “Great Recession” beginning in 2008 sparked a significant increase in 
the offshoring of legal work, pushing both clients and law firms to consider 
sending more legal work abroad.32 After the ABA and a number of state and 
local bar associations issued opinions approving the practice, legal 
offshoring grew even faster.33 
                                                                                                                            
27. Id. 
28. See Amar Gupta & Deth Sao, The Unconstitutionality of Current Legal Barriers to 
Telemedicine in the United States: Analysis and Future Directions of Its Relationship to 
National and International Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2011). 
29. Abdul Latheef Naha, It’s India for Legal Services, THE HINDU (Nov. 26, 2007), 
http://www.hindu.com/edu/2007/11/26/stories/2007112650610300.htm (“LPO is part of high-
end knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) . . . .”). 
30. Michael D. Goldhaber, Tempting Work: Contract Lawyers Are Growing in Numbers 
As Well As Status, 156 N.J. L.J. 469 (1999) (“Lawyer temping came into its own after the 
recession of the early ‘90s, when firms got burned by overhiring associates and the market 
brimmed with unemployed lawyers.”). 
31. See, e.g., Amy Miller, UPS’s Legal Department Brainstorms a Package Deal to Save 
a Parcel of $$$, CORP. COUNSEL (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202435291170&hubType=Top%20Story&UPSs_Legal_Dept_Bra
instorms_a_Package_Deal_to_Save_a_Parcel_of_ (noting that UPS has hired King & Spaulding 
to coordinate its e-discovery, including managing contracts with staffing agencies and e-
discovery vendors). 
32. D’Angelo, supra note 12, at 189; Mike Dolan & John Thickett, The Financial Crisis: 
How Can Corporate Legal Departments and Law Firms Manage the Aftermath?, ANDREWS FIN. 
CRISIS LITIG. REP., Nov. 25, 2008.  
33. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008) 
[hereinafter ABA Opinion 08-451] (discussing lawyers’ obligations when outsourcing legal and 
nonlegal support services), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/ 
IC100123/relatedresources/opinion8-451.pdf; Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm’rs on 
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The type of legal work sent offshore is both varied and changing 
rapidly.34 In general, approximately fifteen percent of LPO professionals 
were performing work equivalent to a junior attorney, and approximately 
eighty-five percent were performing work equivalent to what a paralegal or 
administrative support professional might do in the United States.35 For 
intellectual property work, however, the trend has shifted to include 
offshoring of more high-end work; in this area, “more than 50% of the 
[offshored] work is high end.”36 The percentage of work involving high-
level outsourcing is likely to continue to grow in other areas of the law.37 
In terms of administrative support, outsourcing professionals perform 
low-level legal work, such as filling out legal forms like summonses, 
warrants, or bankruptcy forms, and transcribing depositions.38 Much 
outsourced legal-administrative work relates either to the discovery process, 
                                                                                                                            
Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2009-6 (2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ 
Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/index/o.asp; Colo. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 121 (2009) 
(discussing use of temporary lawyers and other professionals not admitted to practice in 
Colorado (“outsourcing”)), available at http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/ 
25320/CETH/; Prof’l. Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Formal Op. 07-2 (2008), available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin.nsf/b2b76d49e9fd64a5852570050067a7af/792dd018996
bf2498525749400624f7a!OpenDocument; N.C. St. Bar, 2007 Formal Ethics Op. 12 (2008) 
(discussing outsourcing legal support services), available at http://www.osqs.com/images/ 
Resourcespages/barethics/NC%202007%20Formal%20Ethics%20Opinion%2012.pdf; San 
Diego Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 2007-1 (2007), available at http://cobralegalsolutions.com/ 
pdf/San%20Diego%20County%20Bar%20Association.pdf; L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 518 (2006), available at http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm? 
pageid=427; N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-3 (2006), available 
at http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth2006.htm. The ABA subsequently drafted a more in-depth 
report on domestic and offshore outsourcing. See ABA, ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20 
DISCUSSION DRAFT, 10–15 (2010) [hereinafter ABA Discussion Draft], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ethics2020/pdfs/discussion_draft.authch
eckdam.pdf. 
34. See Keith Ecker, The Offshore Option, INSIDE COUNSEL, Jan. 2009, at 41. 
35. Kian Ganz, India LPO Inc Headcounts to Triple as 15% of Work at US/UK Associate 
Level, LEGALLY INDIA (May 6, 2010), http://www.legallyindia.com/20100506778/Legal-
Process-Outsourcing-LPO/india-lpo-inc-headcounts-to-triple-as-15-of-work-usuk-associate-
level. The “85%” figure most likely includes document review. 
36. Evalueserve, LPO and the Great Recession, IP FRONTLINE (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=24227&deptid=3. 
37. The Economist has noted that although low-level outsourcing activities currently 
dominate the Indian market, high-level activities are growing rapidly. See Passage to India, 
ECONOMIST, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16439006? 
story_id=16439006&source=hptextfeature (“Although still dominated by low-value process 
outsourcing, such as call-centres, the fastest growth is in companies offering highly skilled 
work, from medicine to engineering and information technology (IT).”). 
38. Rosemary Ambale, What Do I Need to Join an LPO?, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS 
SIDE OF THE POND (Jan. 10, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/ 
2009/01/what-do-i-need-to-join-lpo.html. 
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to intellectual property work, or to contract management.39 As a result, tasks 
such as document review, coding, contract review, and management of 
contracts databases are often sent offshore.40  
In terms of more complex legal work, foreign attorneys perform legal 
research support, including “multijurisdictional surveys of state and local 
case laws, statutes, ordinances, and regulations,” in addition to providing 
assistance in brief writing and analysis of statutory and case law, citation 
checking, document drafting, and preparing drafts of patent applications.41 
While this higher-level legal work represents only fifteen percent of the 
LPO market right now, it is quickly growing; as LPO firms become more 
established, they tend to take on increasingly more sophisticated work.42 
And although the more complex LPO work is typically performed for large 
corporations who are sophisticated consumers of legal advice, some LPOs 
will even offer their assistance to pro se litigants in the United States.43 
                                                                                                                            
39. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 766 (2010) 
(“[L]egal outsourcing currently focuses on the commodity end of legal work, including risk 
management, contract review, and patent searches, rather than the sophisticated transactional 
work that is Big Law’s comparative advantage”); see also PANDEY, supra note 23, at 11–12; 
Ambale, supra note 38. 
40. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 11–12; Ambale, supra note 38. 
41. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 11–12. 
42. Jordan Furlong, The Blind Side, SLAW (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.slaw.ca/ 
2010/04/03/the-blind-side/ (“LPOs, it has to be emphasized, are not just doing first-year 
associates’ grunt work, not anymore. They are moving up the value chain steadily and with 
surprising speed, taking on the work of second-, third- and fourth-year lawyers—not just by 
using lower-cost labour, but by doing the work more systematically and efficiently.”). But see 
Ron Friedmann, LPO as a Driver of Law Firm Innovation, INTEGREON (July 27, 2010), 
http://www.integreon.com/blog/2010/07/lpo-as-a-driver-of-law-firm-innovation.html (noting 
that at Integreon, “We do not practice law nor is that part of our corporate strategy. So we see a 
clear limit to how far ‘up the value chain’ an LPO can go before it practices law and is therefore 
no longer an LPO.”). 
43. Legal Outsourcing in California Helps Hollywood Win Cases, SDD GLOBAL 
SOLUTIONS, http://www.sddglobal.com/legal-process-outsourcing-in-California.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011) (noting that “clients include production companies, film studios, corporations, 
solo practitioners, law firms, training institutions, individuals and pro se litigants in 
California”). The pro se client who hired SDD Global was himself a licensed attorney in 
California who sought assistance from the firm. Other firms, however, may work directly with 
non-lawyer pro se litigants. See Brent Howard, Testimonials, SUNLEXIS, 
http://www.sunlexis.com/testimonials.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (containing a client 
testimonial stating: “I am a Pro Se litigant in a case against the State of Nevada local 
government. . . . I found SunLexis through the internet and in a little over two week they read 
my complaint, their motion to dismiss, my draft of a response and did amazing research.”). 
Others have theorized that technological innovation may shift the boundaries of regulated law 
practice. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 
MO. L. REV. 299, 324 (2004) (“[T]he fact that Internet law practice can provide effective legal 
assistance on routine matters to a low-income clientele makes opposition by the ABA politically 
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While the types of legal services that LPOs perform are very broad, they 
are not without limit entirely: state law in the United States prohibits non-
state-licensed individuals from “the practice of law.”44 Indian law likewise 
prohibits foreign-owned LPOs from practicing law in India.45 The definition 
of practicing law is broader in the United States than it is in India, however. 
In the United States, legal advice is included within the ambit of legal 
practice, whereas Indian law typically considers the practice of law as 
“appearance before any court, tribunal, or similar authority.”46 Historically 
in India, the practice of law was thought to exclude “legal advice, 
documentation or seeking alternative routes for dispute-resolution,”47 
though recently the Mumbai High Court has ruled that the term “practice of 
law” under Section 29 of the Indian Advocates Act is “wide enough to 
cover” legal practice “in non litigious matters.”48 Even under the broader 
U.S. definition, however, most jurisdictions allow legal work to be 
delegated to non-lawyers as long as a U.S.-licensed attorney takes ultimate 
responsibility for the legal work.49 
Legal work is offshored to a number of countries, including China, the 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka,50 but India is by far the most common 
destination. Indian revenue from legal process outsourcing (LPO) was 
valued at $320 million in 2008, and expected to grow to $640 million by 
2015;51 80% of this revenue comes from U.S. clients, while the remainder 
comes from other counties such as Australia and the U.K.52 Work is 
performed by Indian attorneys who have graduated from the top law schools 
                                                                                                                            
unattractive. In general, these new business methods demand a clearer theory of the appropriate 
scope of regulation than is provided by the existing analytical framework.”). 
44. See Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 427–30. 
45. Lawyers Collective v. Ashurst, (2009) W.P. No. 1526/1995 (India), available at 
http://www.barandbench.com/userfiles/files/File/Lawyers%20Collective%20foreign%20firms%
20Bbay%20HC.pdf. 
46. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 63. 
47. Id. 
48. Lawyers Collective, at ¶ 60. 
49. See Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 429–30 (“Lawyers are punished only when their 
failure to supervise their employees facilitates the employees’ UPL activities or when the 
lawyers deliberately assist the UPL activities of affiliated organizations. . . . [L]aw firms, in 
deciding to offshore legal services, likely face few, if any, UPL hurdles as a practical matter.”). 
50. Christian, supra note 9; see also American Discovery, About Us, 
http://www.americandiscovery.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (offering discovery 
support services from the Philippines).  
51. Viren Naidu, LPO In India Is Expected to Lead the Offshore Field In the Next Three-
Five Years, ECON. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:48 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
opinion/interviews/lpo-in-india-is-expected-to-lead-the-offshore-field-in-the-next-three-five-
years/articleshow/5800286.cms. 
52. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 96. 
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in India.53 These law schools provide common-law legal instruction 
conducted primarily in English.54 Thus, even though the Indian attorneys 
may be working with foreign law, the legal systems are similar enough that 
the attorneys transition relatively easily. In fact, as one LPO manager noted, 
Indian attorneys employed by LPOs sometimes have greater familiarity 
with U.S. law than they do with Indian law: 
Training young lawyers in an LPO firm, I was amazed to find that 
they knew more about US and UK laws than the laws in India. 
They could tell me about euthanasia provisions for animals in the 
UK but had no idea if similar provisions existed in India. They 
knew all about insurance law in the US, but asked if we have 
anything like this here, they were unsure.55 
C. The Financial and Mechanical Aspects of Outsourcing 
Legal process outsourcing results in monetary savings for the law firms 
and companies who engage in it. The cost savings are significant. One in-
house attorney reported asking for quotes for customizing a residential lease 
                                                                                                                            
53. Interviews with Kevin Colangelo, Pangea3, and Sanjay Bhatia, SDD Global (noting 
that their LPO firms hire only from the top schools). But see also Mark Ross, Is Everything 
What It Seems in the India Offshore Legal Outsourcing Space?, LEGAL PROCESS OUTSOURCING 
(Aug. 16, 2007, 10:20 AM), http://blog.law-scribe.com/2007/08/is-everything-what-it-seems-in-
india.html (noting that “legal process outsourcing companies, law firm captives and Western 
companies with their own captive arrangements in India all maintain that they only hire the 
most highly qualified candidates from the best law schools in India” but expressing doubt that 
“everyone can be telling the truth” about hiring only the most qualified graduates). However, at 
this time, the number of attorneys working in LPOs is still a tiny fraction of the law graduates in 
India. There are more than one million law graduates in India, with only an estimated 7,500 to 
32,000 working in LPOs. Therefore, it seems quite possible that LPOs can afford to hire only 
top graduates at this time, though that may change in the future as the industry continues to 
expand at current rates. See id.; Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 57, 61 (2010). 
54. See Marc Galanter, When Legal Worlds Collide: Reflections on Bhopal, the Good 
Lawyer, and the American Law School, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 292, 293 (1986) (noting that the 
Indian legal system “operates in English”). But see Laura D’Allaird, “The Indian Lawyer”: 
Legal Education in India and Protecting the Duty of Confidentiality While Outsourcing, 18 
PROF. LAW. 1, 6, 12 n.70 (2007) (noting that “even though legal education was officially 
mandated in English due to English being the official language of India,” some language 
difficulties persist). 
55. Rosemary Ambale, Quality in LPOs, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS SIDE OF THE POND 
(Nov. 19, 2009, 7:06 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/2009/11/quality-in-
lpos.html. 
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in each of the fifty states.56 The company’s law firm offered to do it for 
$400,000; an Indian LPO firm offered to do it for $45,000.57 The company’s 
chief operating officer chose to outsource.58 Much of the savings come from 
an enormous salary differential: an LPO salary for an Indian attorney is 
approximately $10,000—or 1/16 of the $160,000 base salary earned by a 
first-year associate at a large U.S. law firm.59 Similarly, for higher level 
contract drafting and legal research, the difference may be $400 an hour for 
a London-based attorney versus $50 an hour for a Gurgaon-based 
attorney.60 
Mechanically, parties outsource in two primary ways.61 The first way, 
adopted primarily by very large corporations, is to establish a “captive 
center”—essentially, an offshore branch of the company in a lower-cost 
location.62 General Electric adopted this strategy in 2005, employing thirty 
Indian lawyers to support the corporation’s legal work.63 Currently, 
approximately fifteen large corporations have established such centers.64 
The second and more common way of outsourcing is to hire a “third party 
LPO service provider.”65 Major providers include Pangea3, Clutch Group, 
Integreon, and CPA Global.  
Interestingly, even though many of the ethics opinions and legal 
scholarship dealing with outsourcing seem to assume that law firms will be 
the ones leading the way, this is not the case.66 Instead, it is corporations in 
need of legal services—rather than the law firms that have traditionally 
provided that service—that so far have taken the lead in sending work 
                                                                                                                            
56. Cynthia Cotts & Liane Kufchock, Jones Day, Kirkland Send Work to India to Cut 
Costs, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2007, 4:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601103&sid=aBo8DnfekWZQ. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Anthony Lin, Legal Outsourcing to India Is Growing, But Still Confronts 
Fundamental Issues, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 2008; see also Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is 
Flat: Globalization and Its Effect on Lawyers Practicing in Non-Global Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 527, 537 (2008) (“LPO salaries for Indian lawyers are generally well below $10,000 
a year. By comparison, a U.S. contract lawyer usually earns around $30 an hour while associate 
base salaries at major firms in New York start at $160,000 a year.”). 
60. Passage to India, supra note 37.  
61. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2189, 2195 n.16, 2201–02 (2007) (discussing additional outsourcing methods, 
including U.S. companies who hire Indian law firms and hiring U.S.-licensed attorneys who 
work abroad). 
62. PANDEY, supra note 23, at 46. 
63. Id. 
64. Ganz, supra note 35. 
65. Id. 
66. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 12, at 476 (advocating a new ABA rule requiring lawyers 
to disclose international outsourcing arrangements to clients). 
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offshore.67 Companies’ outside law firms may participate in the process of 
offshoring if their clients demand it, but most law firms are unlikely to 
initiate it without client participation.68 The few law firms who do initiate 
outsourcing arrangements are more likely to be plaintiffs’ firms working on 
contingency fees.69 When attorneys bill hourly, savings from outsourcing 
accrue to the client; but when attorneys contract for a percentage of the 
recovery, savings from outsourcing can accrue to the attorney. 
Corporations choosing to send work offshore will rarely publicly 
announce that they are doing so.70 First, there is a risk that competitors will 
follow suit, thus diminishing any competitive advantage gained from 
outsourcing.71 Second, there is also a risk that the outsourcing company will 
be punished in the marketplace by U.S. residents politically opposed to 
outsourcing in general.72 However, a few large corporations have been 
willing to go public about their offshoring practices. Microsoft, for 
example, revealed that it spent $3 million in 2008 on patent LPO services in 
                                                                                                                            
67. Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 414 (quoting an outsourcing manager as saying that 
“[c]orporate law departments . . . are much more apt [than law firms] to make use of outsourced 
legal staff, often because other corporate divisions also have cut costs through outsourcing”); 
see Evalueserve, supra note 36 (“More than 90% of the LPO work is either being directly 
outsourced by Corporate Counsels or on behalf of Corporate Counsels (by their preferred law 
firms).”).  
68. See, e.g., Cotts & Kufchock, supra note 56 (quoting David Perla, co-chief executive of 
a major outsourcing provider: “Some firms are coming to us because in-house clients suggested 
it or pressured them. . . . Others want to come to the client first and offer a solution.”); see also 
Kit Chellel, Slaughters in Talks Over Outsourcing Plans, THE LAWYER, Oct. 5, 2009, at 1 
(discussing mounting client pressure to outsource, causing top firms in England to send legal 
work offshore). 
69. FIRST RESEARCH, INDUSTRY PROFILE: LEGAL SERVICES (2009), available at 
http://www.tba.org/benefits/FirstResearch-LegalServices.pdf (“Some law firms, especially 
contingency firms, cut costs by outsourcing legal processes overseas.”). 
70. George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 96 
VA. L. REV. 241, 243 (2010); see also Press Release, PRLog, Wall of Silence Surrounds 
Emerging Legal Outsourcing Industry (July 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.prlog.org/10781658-wall-of-silence-surrounds-emerging-legal-outsourcing-
industry.html (“In a Fronterion survey of 30 top US firms in the Am Law 50, some 83 percent 
declined to comment on whether they had used legal process outsourcing (LPO) providers, 
despite the fact that responses were confidential.”). 
71. Geis, supra note 70, at 243. But see Rees Morrison, To What Degree Do General 
Counsel Hoard Their Management Innovations and Not Share Them with Others, Especially 
Competitors?, LAW DEP’T MGMT. BLOG (Dec. 31, 2010, 9:12 AM), 
http://www.lawdepartmentmanagementblog.com/law_department_management/2010/12/to-
what-degree-do-general-counsel-hoard-their-management-innovations-and-not-share-them-
with-others-especially-competitors.html (“It has not been my impression that general counsel 
conceal their management efforts and experiences from each other because of a concern for 
proprietary value or a competitive edge. When general counsel talk among themselves in trade 
groups or at other gatherings, they seem willing to share openly and completely.”). 
72. Id. 
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India, including prior art searches, invalidity searches, and project 
mapping—work that would have cost it $9.5 million in the United States.73 
International outsourcing is often publicly criticized as eliminating U.S. 
jobs.74 It can be difficult to estimate the actual impact of offshoring on U.S. 
employment. Although some assume that outsourcing results in one-to-one 
impact where one U.S. job is lost for every job sent offshore,75 this is not 
actually the case: instead, the process of offshoring can lead to higher global 
employment overall.76 Because outsourcing allows services to be provided 
at lower costs, it allows consumers of those services to purchase more 
services than they otherwise would, thereby “slowly chang[ing] client 
behavior.”77 Just as the introduction of low-cost European airlines allowed 
customers in Europe to “now think nothing of going abroad for the 
weekend, or even of commuting to another country for the workweek,” 
outsourcing can similarly increase the services demanded in new areas.78 
This effect almost certainly carries over into the legal field, as offshoring 
creates the ability to pursue and/or defend more claims than could otherwise 
be litigated affordably. If not for outsourcing, the Ali G litigation might 
have settled instead of going to court. Likewise, at least one high-profile 
criminal defendant, Denis Field, the former Chairman and CEO of the 
                                                                                                                            
73. CPA GLOBAL, OUTSOURCING AS A BUSINESS MODEL, available at 
http://www.cpaglobal.com/ sites/default/files/2008_microsoft_case_study.pdf (last visited Mar. 
15, 2010). 
74. See, e.g., Andrew S. Ross, Obama Riles High-Tech Exec Over Outsourcing, S.F. GATE 
(May 5, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-05-05/business/17201203_1_international-tax-
dla-piper-cisco-systems (noting that “President Obama promis[ed] to end overseas tax breaks 
for U.S. companies that ‘create a job in Bangalore, India, (rather than) one in Buffalo, N.Y.’”). 
75. See, e.g., Krishnan, supra note 61, at 2206 n.81 (noting that one study estimated that 
79,000 people will be employed in the legal outsourcing field in India but that only 40,400 U.S. 
attorneys will lose their jobs, and concluding that the estimate “ostensibly mean[s] that the 
remaining ‘legal’ jobs outsourced will be paralegal and more secretarial in nature”). While 
many legal outsourcing firms do indeed employ Indian attorneys to perform paralegal and 
secretarial work, an alternative interpretation of the data is simply that offshoring will increase 
the amount of legal work performed, thus employing more Indian attorneys. 
76. A McKinsey report estimated that every $1 spent on offshoring by U.S. companies 
created “US$1.45–1.47 of value to the global economy, with the USA capturing US$1.12–1.14 
and the receiving country capturing on average 33 cents.” MARK KOBAYASHI-HILLARY & 
RICHARD SYKES, GLOBAL SERVICES: MOVING TO A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 124 (2007). Thus, 
higher global employment levels may arise from an increase in the global economy as well as 
from lower salary costs offshore. See also Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya & T.N. 
Srinivasan, The Muddles Over Outsourcing, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 99 (2004) (“[E]ven if 
outsourcing sometimes reduces jobs proximately at certain firms or in certain sectors, in other 
cases it can help to create new U.S. jobs.”). 
77. Innovators at the Barricades, ADAM SMITH ESQ. (July 19, 2010, 10:50 PM), 
http://www.adamsmithesq.com/archives/2010/07/innovators-at-the-barricades.html. 
78. Id. 
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accounting firm BDO Seidman, has hired an Indian firm to provide 
additional research and drafting services in the defense of his tax-shelter 
prosecution—services that he could not afford at typical U.S. rates.79 Thus, 
on the whole, offshoring likely creates more jobs than it eliminates.80 
Futhermore, the cost savings achieved from offshoring lower-level work 
may create more high-end jobs onshore.81 
Just as outsourcing may create new jobs domestically rather than merely 
transitioning work abroad, the financial benefits of outsourcing are also felt 
both onshore and off.82 Generally, researchers have found that seventy to 
eighty percent of the economic benefits from offshoring remain with the 
country sending work offshore—only twenty to thirty percent accrue to the 
country accepting the work.83 From the client’s perspective, legal 
outsourcing is likely to create similar economic gain, as lower legal costs 
allow companies to reinvest savings into production and profit. 
While legal offshoring may result in a net economic gain, particular 
subsets of U.S. attorneys have been detrimentally affected by the trend.84 
Junior attorneys and contract attorneys who work as temporary employees 
have seen wages decline as corporate clients press for ever-lower rates.85 
Much of the work that is currently subject to outsourcing—including 
document review and basic legal research—is work that junior attorneys in 
                                                                                                                            
79. Vidya Devaiah, Embattled Ex-Head of 5th Largest Accounting Firm Turns to Indian 
Legal Outsourcing, LAW WITHOUT BORDERS (July 7, 2010), http://lawwithoutborders. 
typepad.com/legaloutsourcing/2010/07/denis-field-hires-indian-legal-outsourcing-company-
embattled-exchairmanceo-of-fifth-largest-accounti.html. 
80. Outsourcing Creates Jobs, Study Says, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 30, 2004), 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/30/news/economy/outsourcing/index.htm. 
81. Larry E. Ribstein, Where Have All the Lawyers Gone, FORBES, Aug. 8, 2010 (“The 
legal services industry will soon look very different from what we’re used to. While there will 
always be a need for high-end legal talent, wage workers and machines will be able to do much 
of the rest of the rest [sic] of what is now law practice. On the positive side, lawyers will meet a 
better fate than the soldiers in Pete Seeger’s song: gone to India, or to jobs that are more worthy 
of their talents than the more routine types of law practice today.”). 
82. Bhagwati, Panagariya & Srinivasan, supra note 76, at 99 (explaining that because 
outsourcing can make new projects financially viable, those projects can lead to increased 
employment both domestically and overseas). In one case, for example, an engineering project 
“seemed financially nonviable” in the absence of outsourcing. Id. With outsourcing, however, 
the project became viable, and “[f]or each engineer in India, the firm now employees six 
engineers in the United States.” Id.  
83. KOBAYASHI-HILLARY & SYKES, supra note 76, at 91. 
84. Michael G. Owen, Legal Outsourcing to India: The Demise of New Lawyers and 
Junior Associates, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 175, 188 (2008). 
85. Julie Kay, Contract Lawyers: Cheaper by the Hour: Use of Contract Attorneys Grows, 
As Do the Complaints, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 12, 2009. 
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the United States would typically perform.86 Furthermore, in other 
industries, individuals whose jobs were lost to globalization did not recover 
economically in the long term.87 To young attorneys displaced by 
globalization, the creation of jobs in foreign countries and rising corporate 
profits may be of little consolation.88 
D. Quality and Satisfaction in Legal Offshoring 
Clients generally report satisfaction with their offshoring effort. 
Approximately seventy percent of outsourcing deals in general are renewed 
after the expiration of the first contract, suggesting that most outsourcing 
clients are satisfied both with offshoring practices in general, as well as 
satisfied with the particular vendors supplying the work.89 With regard to 
legal outsourcing in particular, a recent survey of offshoring clients—both 
corporations and law firms—reported that only 7.7% of U.S. law firms and 
6.8% of corporations experienced “strong dissatisfaction” with their 
offshoring experiences.90 Thus, it seems likely that LPO clients will engage 
in ongoing outsourcing relationships as their counterparts in other industries 
have done. 
In general, companies report that LPO vendors provide high quality 
services.91 An attorney from Baker McKenzie conducted a comparison of 
first-level document review at onshore and offshore locations, comparing 
cost, quality, learning curve, and productivity.92 The attorney concluded that 
the Indian LPO ranked better on cost, slightly worse on length of the 
learning curve, and ranked comparably on quality and productivity.93 David 
Perla, co-founder of Pangea3, also had clients conduct “bake-offs” where 
                                                                                                                            
86. Owen, supra note 84, at 189 (noting that junior attorneys will lack opportunities for 
training when low-level work is outsourced). 
87. Srinivas Durvasula & Steven Lysonski, How Offshore Outsourcing Is Perceived: Why 
Do Some Consumers Feel More Threatened?, 21 J. INT’L CONSUMER MKTG. 17, 29 (2009) 
(“The Bureau of Labor Statistics found that of those whose jobs were displaced by overseas 
trade from 1979 to 1999, 31 percent were not fully reemployed and 55 percent were making 85 
percent or less than their former wages.”). 
88. See, e.g., Heather Timmons, Outsourcing to India Draws Western Lawyers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010 (reporting “hostility toward the practice” of offshoring from junior 
associates). 
89. Christian, supra note 9. 
90. Report: Key Findings From Legal Process Outsourcing Survey, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 
2, 2010. 
91. Lin, supra note 59; Gavin Birer, The Results are in and the Winner Is . . . , SLAW (Apr. 
20, 2009), http://www.slaw.ca/2009/04/20/the-results-are-in-and-the-winner-is%E2%80%A6/. 
92. Birer, supra note 91. 
93. Id. 
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they compared the results of document review completed by Indian 
attorneys and by U.S. contract attorneys.94 Clients found that the Indian 
teams “soundly trounced” the Americans.95 
Again, however, there are some reports of dissatisfaction. For example, 
one U.S. company ended its practice of offshoring deposition summaries 
after it spent too much time changing British-English idioms into American 
English; the company reported that the Indian employees “would use words 
like ‘fortnight’ (to describe a two-week period) and ‘bonnet’ (for the hood 
of a car).”96 The company also found quality to be inconsistent, with some 
deposition summaries being excellent, and others being unacceptable.97 
Others have noted that many LPO applicants may not have the precise 
technical and legal vocabulary to succeed in providing legal support 
services for Western attorneys.98 
                                                                                                                            
94. Lin, supra note 59. 
95. Id. 
96. Petra Pasternak, When Outsourcing Proves Too Expensive, Bring It on Home, LEGAL 
PAD (May 17, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://legalpad.typepad.com/my_weblog/2010/05/when-
outsourcing-proves-too-expensive-bring-it-on-home.html; see also Rosemary Ambale, Are 
Indian Lawyers Turning into Clerks?, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS SIDE OF THE POND (Aug. 9, 
2009, 4:21 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/2009/08/are-indian-lawyers-
turning-into-clerks.html (noting that some Indian attorneys may struggle with technical legal 
English: “Not understanding the difference between ‘referring’ and ‘referral’, ‘consistent’ and 
‘consisting’, ‘verily’ and ‘verify’, ‘at’ and ‘on’, can indeed, like Cleopatra’s nose, decide 
fates.”). 
97. Pasternak, supra note 96. 
98. Excerpts from cover letters sent from job applicants included the following statements: 
• “I went thru yr ad in job portal and am very much interested in offering 
services to yr esteemed organ.”  
• “Dear Responsible, I heared as a vacancy in your Organization for the 
Legal Designation. The Organization may adobt me in yourself if I 
eligible as a Employee.” 
• “Respected sir/madam, i am interesting to join lpo job for hike of my 
career in corporate legal firms . . . .” 
• “sir, Here attached my resume for your vision if you have any suitable 
job, please contact my mobile.” 
• “DEAR MADAM/SIR, KINDLY CHECK MY CV IN ATTACHMENT 
ALSO SUGGEST ME A LEGAL JOBBY WHICH I WILL LEARN 
LOT LEGAL ACT.” 
• “Res. sir, This application apply for the above subject matter of the E-
mail. other description attached on the file attached. . . . And it was while 
having the privilege to work for certain reputed corps. Of international 
fame, I got a well fermented atmosphere to process in search of 
reformative thesis to sooth the conduct of regulation of policy and 
legislations which minimized the disputes to considerable limits . . . .” 
Sanjay Bhatia, Starting Your Own LPO? Here’s How to Do It. And How Not to., LAW WITHOUT 
BORDERS (July 16, 2010), http://lawwithoutborders.typepad.com/legaloutsourcing/2010/07/ 
starting-your-own-lpo-heres-how-to-do-it-and-how-not-to.html.  
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Because of the possible risks of dissatisfaction, most LPO participants 
recommend the clients begin outsourcing on a small scale at first: “No 
matter how convinced a law firm is of the ability of an LPO to meet its 
efficiency and due-diligence standards, prudence dictates that it test the 
waters by sending out smaller jobs initially, and then graduate slowly to 
larger ones.”99 LPO firms are also taking additional measures to reduce the 
dissatisfaction rate further, focusing on improving quality control by adding 
additional levels of review, improving training programs, and integrating 
teams of Indian and Western attorneys.100 
II. SOCIOECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
Given that legal offshoring seems here to stay, participants in the 
offshoring process must find ways to ensure that it is done effectively. Both 
ethics opinions and legal scholars have stressed the need for outsourced 
legal services to comply with the duties of competence, confidentiality, and 
avoidance of conflicts of interest. Some have offered some concrete 
suggestions.101 But many questions remain. The ethics opinions are 
unanimous that offshored legal work must still comply with ethical duties—
a licensed attorney must supervise the work, clients’ information must be 
kept confidential, and the legal services must be competently rendered.102 
The opinions, however, give little guidance as to how the parties to the 
outsourcing transaction should ensure that these duties are met. 
Socioeconomic and organizational behavior theory can help shed light 
on where problems in the outsourcing process are likely to arise and how 
those problems can be minimized. This section focuses on outsourcing risks 
that arise from the contracting process generally, given that each party to a 
                                                                                                                            
99. Rosemary Ambale, Obama and the Indian in the LPO, LEGAL OUTSOURCING—THIS 
SIDE OF THE POND (May 23, 2009, 10:17 AM), http://rosemary-outsourcing.blogspot.com/ 
2009/05/obama-and-indian-in-lpo.html. 
100. See E-mail from Sabyasachi Ghosh, Vice-President, Legal Operations, SKJ Legal 
(June 7, 2010) (recommending a “2nd level QC [quality-control check] of the Indian LPO work 
products by an American attorney, whether he is sitting in India or in the US, before the work 
reaches the clients”); Interview with Kevin Colangelo, General Counsel and Vice President, 
Legal Services, Pangea3 (June 9, 2010) (emphasizing the need for institutionalized training); 
Bhatia, supra note 98. 
101. See, e.g., Daly & Silver, supra note 12, at 425–47 (recommending strategies to ensure 
compliance with the rules of professional responsibility); see also ABA Opinion 08-451, supra 
note 33 (recommending that lawyers involved in the outsourcing decision interview prospective 
legal services providers, conduct reference checks on individual service providers, investigate 
the security of LPO offices, and, in some cases, visit those offices personally). 
102. See, e.g., ABA Opinion 08-451, supra note 33.  
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contract has different interests.103 It examines leading theories in both the 
socioeconomic and organizational realms that have been applied to the 
analysis of outsourcing decisions, and it explains how the theories inter-
relate in the outsourcing context.104  
A. Socioeconomic Theory 
Socioeconomic theory can help illuminate the costs and benefits of 
outsourcing. Traditionally, scholars looking at outsourcing outside the legal 
industry have applied an economic and strategic lens to the question of 
“why and what” to outsource.105 Such analysis is also helpful inside the 
legal industry, where it can help predict where problems may arise and 
suggest ways of addressing those problems. 
This section sets out basic principles from three socioeconomic theories. 
First, agency theory explains how the interests of a principal (here, the 
client) and an agent (the service provider) may differ, creating risks of 
opportunistic behavior.106 Second, transaction cost theory builds on agency 
theory to examine when the cost savings obtained from outsourcing are 
sufficient to offset the control of keeping work in-house.107 Finally, resource 
dependence theory helps explain the conditions under which an agent will 
be most responsive to the client’s needs.108 Together, these theories shed 
light on the different incentives driving each of the parties in the 
outsourcing transaction. 
1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory focuses on the relationship between the principal (in an 
outsourcing arrangement, the client purchasing the outsourced service) and 
the agent (the service vendor).109 Agency theory posits that clients and 
                                                                                                                            
103. Other risks arise from the disaggregation of legal services into component parts and 
from the possibility of cross cultural misunderstanding; the next section deals with these in 
greater depth. 
104. See Jens Dibbern et al., Information Systems Outsourcing: A Survey and Analysis of 
the Literature, 35 ACM SIGMIS DATABASE 6 (2004) (conducting a literature review). 
105. Id. 
106. See infra Part II.A.1. 
107. See infra Part II.A.2. 
108. See infra Part II.A.3. 
109. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 
VA. L. REV. 1707, 1735–38 (1998) (discussing agency theory in the context of law firm 
employment); Ted Schneyer, Reputational Bonding, Ethics Rules, and Law Firm Structure: The 
Economist as Storyteller, 84 VA. L. REV. 1777, 1793–94 (1998); see also Subrata Chakrabarty, 
Real-Life Case Studies of Offshore Outsourced IS Projects: Analysis of Issues and Socio-
 
 
 
 
 
20 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
vendors seek to fulfill different interests.110 One of the main conflicting 
interests is financial: for example, one recent outsourcing survey found that 
clients expected an outsourcing contract to provide a five to twelve percent 
profit margin to the service provider, while the service provider sought a 
profit margin of fifteen to twenty-five percent.111  
Agency theory has long been a staple of legal practice generally, as 
lawyers are expected to act as agents representing the client, though the 
agency model does not explain the lawyer/client relationship entirely.112 In a 
legal outsourcing arrangement, the client’s two main interests are receiving 
quality legal work and minimizing the cost associated with that work.113 The 
client may also value flexibility, including the ability to have legal support 
when required, without needing to carry permanent employees on the 
payroll. The vendor, on the other hand, has an interest in maximizing the 
amount earned.114 The vendor may also value stability over flexibility. 
Because the vendor is likely to incur costs in recruiting and training the 
workers, a stable workflow minimizes the costs associated with employee 
turnover. These conflicting interests will be reconciled, though imperfectly, 
by contract.115 The client, who serves as the principal in the agency 
relationship, and the vendor, who serves as the agent, allocate responsibility 
in an attempt to allow both to maximize their interests.  
Like other agency relationships, the client/vendor agreement creates 
costs in excess of the client’s financial payments.116 Total agency costs are 
                                                                                                                            
Economic Paradigms, in HARBHAJAN S. KEHAL & VARINDER P. SINGH, OUTSOURCING AND 
OFFSHORING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 248, 272 (2006) 
(discussing agency theory in the context of information-services outsourcing). 
110. Chakrabarty, supra note 109, at 252. 
111. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, OUTSOURCING COMES OF AGE: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE PARTNERING 12 (2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/ 
operations-consulting-services/pdf/outsourcingcomesofage.pdf. 
112. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2075 (2010) (noting that “[e]lite 
lawyers never conceived of themselves . . . as ‘deferential servants’ who merely carry out the 
client’s bidding”) (quoting ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (1993)). 
113. See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 955, 1002–03 (2007) (noting that falling interaction costs can give rise to growth 
in outsourcing, as “business activity is moved to low-cost markets,” but also arguing that 
reduced monitoring costs may also be part of that equation, as clients may be better able to 
control the quality of the final product, “mitigat[ing] the dark side of outsourcing”). 
114. Id. at 992 (“The vendor has no incentive to tackle a project in a cost-effective manner 
because she will be paid for shirking or other inefficient behavior.”). 
115. Chakrabarty, supra note 109, at 272. 
116. See Geis, supra note 113, at 978 (“Outsourcing deals thus generate agency risk under a 
very familiar logic: the entity that controls a business activity does not ultimately ‘own’ the 
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said to equal the sum of the monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual 
loss.117 Monitoring costs fall upon the client who outsources work; the client 
must monitor the quality of the work being done and the reasonableness of 
the charges for that work.118 Bonding costs, on the other hand, fall upon the 
vendor performing the work.119 Bonding costs are defined as expenditures 
that the agent makes “to guarantee that the agent will not take certain 
actions [which would] harm the principal,”—for example, the vendor may 
purchase insurance or otherwise “create some pool of resources or a legal 
obligation from which the principal can be compensated for detrimental 
actions of the agent.”120 Finally, residual losses arise from any remaining 
disparity between the principal’s and agent’s interests that is not eliminated 
by contract.121  
While agency theory has a long scholarly history, most researchers agree 
that agency theory alone does not fully explain business decisions. Agency 
theory has been criticized for a “narrow view of rationality” and, 
specifically, its inattention to ethical norms.122 However, agency theory 
makes a strong contribution to understanding the differing interests and 
incentives of each party in the relationship, and when combined with other 
theories discussed below, can aid in understanding some of the risks that 
arise in the outsourcing process. 
2. Transaction Cost Theory  
Transaction cost theory, first developed by Ronald Coase, examines why 
some activities are “executed across markets” whiles others “are 
                                                                                                                            
economic result . . . . Unless resources are spent on monitoring, bonding, or other contractual 
protection, business outsourcing breeds a host of distorted incentives.”). 
117. See Chakrabarty, supra note 109, at 272; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“[A]gency costs [are] the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by 
the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, (3) the residual loss.” (emphasis 
omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
118. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 117, at 308. 
119. Id. 
120. Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by 
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 515, 538–39 (2007). 
121. Id. 
122. Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 265, 277 (1998) (citing Daniel Levinthal, A Survey of Agency Models of 
Organizations, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 153, 154 (1988)). 
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internalized within the unitary firm.”123 Given that the decision to outsource 
involves that very question, it is not surprising that transaction cost theory 
has frequently been applied to analyze outsourcing arrangements.124  
Transaction cost theory asserts that “coordination by exchange” on the 
open market is the default position, and is “generally more efficient.”125 But 
when the market fails and transaction costs are high, then firms will 
internalize the activity.126 Firms are “less sensitive and responsive to 
changes in price or demand” than market actors, but firms also possess 
strong administrative controls to direct the activity and ensure results.127 
Thus, transaction cost theory suggests that a client will decide to 
outsource—either on or off shore—when the savings gained from that 
transaction outweigh the administrative control the client would retain by 
keeping the service in-house. The question of how to measure these 
transaction costs has given rise to a great deal of scholarship.128 Transaction 
costs include both the “direct costs of managing relationships and the 
opportunity costs of suboptimal governance decisions,”129 as well as “search 
and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, [and] policing and 
enforcement costs.”130 These transaction costs have also been usefully 
categorized as “coordination costs” which are “associated with collecting 
and integrating information into the decision process” and “transaction risk” 
costs “associated with the possibility that other parties will fail to meet their 
contractual obligations due to opportunism.”131 
Regardless of how the transaction costs are categorized, they are held to 
include the agency costs identified above, such as the cost of monitoring 
performance, the increased cost of the contract from bonding activity, and 
                                                                                                                            
123. Jeffery Atik, Technology and Distribution as Organizational Elements Within 
International Strategic Alliances, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 273, 282 (1993) (citing Ronald 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (N.S.) 386 (1937)). 
124. Dibbern et al., supra note 104, at 14 (noting that transaction cost theory is one of the 
“main reference theory or theories embraced in the research articles” examining outsourcing). 
125. Atik, supra note 123, at 286. 
126. Id. 
127. Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2349 (2004). 
128. George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 107 
(2009). 
129. Id. at 107 n.28 (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 
(1996); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES (1975)). 
130. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979). 
131. Jeff K. Stratman, Facilitating Offshoring with Enterprise Technologies: Reducing 
Operational Friction in the Governance and Production of Services, 26 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 
275, 278 (2007). 
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residual loss. In this way, transaction cost theory and agency theory can 
work together to explain outsourcing decisions. Both theories are 
“concerned with similar issues and appear to be moving toward even more 
common conceptual ground.”132 As a result, it is helpful to consider the 
theories in conjunction; scholars have suggested that “blending constructs 
and propositions from the two theories may further improve our 
understanding of market[] phenomena.”133 
Just as agency theory has been criticized for its inattention to behavioral 
and ethical considerations, transaction cost theory has been subject to 
similar criticism. Specifically, researchers have argued that transaction cost 
theory may fail in practice when “managers are incapable of implementing” 
the rules of behavior upon which transaction cost theory depends.134 
However, while researchers have criticized transaction cost theory’s ability 
to provide normative guidance, they agree that the theory has merit for 
“descriptive and analytical purposes”—that is, it can help explain why 
choices are made, even if it cannot effectively guide those choices at the 
outset.135 And indeed, in the outsourcing context, empirical study has found 
“modest evidence” in support of transaction cost theory, noting that “parties 
write contracts with more hierarchical governance features when a deal 
involves complex business functions or imposes stricter barriers to exit.”136 
3. Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory focuses on the environment of 
organizations.137 It examines firms within their external environments, and 
examines their dependence on actors outside the firm for critical 
resources.138 The theory “argues that organizations are other-directed, 
involved in a constant struggle for autonomy and discretion, confronted 
with constraints and external control.”139  
                                                                                                                            
132. Mark Bergen et al., Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implications 
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133. Id. 
134. Sumantra Ghoshal & Peter Moran, Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction 
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135. Id. at 40. 
136. Geis, supra note 70, at 293. 
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Resource dependence theory also can be integrated with agency theory 
and transaction cost theory. One theme of both agency theory and 
transaction cost theory is opportunism—the idea that contracting parties 
have an incentive to act in their own interest, which may well conflict with 
the interest of their contracting partner.140 Resource dependence theory links 
some of these interests. It suggests that organizations will “respond most 
quickly and substantively to those stakeholders upon whom they depend for 
resources.”141 Thus, large corporate clients like Microsoft may find LPO 
vendors to be especially responsive to meeting their needs. On the other 
hand, smaller clients who supply only a fraction of the vendors’ resources 
may find the vendors to be less responsive.  
Resource dependence theory helps to explain why many large 
corporations are beginning to reduce the total number of firms performing 
legal work for them. As one lawyer noted, when work was spread among a 
large number of law firms, the firms had little incentive to offer discounted 
fees or to “give close management attention to the work.”142 Because each 
firm had little to gain from the relationship, general counsels also believe 
that the “firms had little incentive to cooperate with one another on our 
behalf by sharing information and collaborating.”143 Law firms themselves 
may simply drop smaller clients—in some cases, lawyers “serving smaller, 
more local clients were expressly told to drop these matters and to refocus 
their efforts on providing support for the firm’s large global clients.”144 
For large corporate clients, the solution to the resource dependence 
problem may involve consolidating work so that a smaller number of 
outside firms perform their work, thus allowing the company to retain 
                                                                                                                            
140. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: 
A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 654 (1993) (“Parties to 
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transaction costs—to address the barriers to fully contingent bargains between principals and 
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142. Wilkins, supra note 112, at 2086. 
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“trophy client” status.145 Smaller clients are unlikely to have this option—
they likely do not generate enough work to obtain trophy client status. 
These smaller companies may have better luck seeking out a more 
specialized vendor.146 Even if no particular client is supplying the majority 
of the vendor’s resources, the vendor may otherwise focus on the client’s 
business category, for example, working with particular types of small firms 
or cases (e.g., small bankruptcy firms or no-fault insurance cases147). 
Because the clients are similar, the vendor can supply similar services to all 
of them, thus gaining the responsiveness benefit suggested by resource-
dependence theory.148 
Resources need not be monetary. There are at least four different species 
of capital that play a role in the outsourcing equation—economic, 
intellectual, social, and symbolic.149 Economic capital is the funding that 
clients pay for outsourcing services.150 Intellectual capital consists of 
specialized knowledge and competence in the field;151 both clients and 
vendors possess such intellectual capital, and, at least in the case of high-
level legal outsourcing, the client is paying the vendor specifically for 
sharing the vendor’s legal knowledge and competence. Social capital 
includes access to stakeholders and decisionmakers.152 When a client hires 
an onshore law firm as an intermediary to manage the outsourcing process, 
the law firm has access to valuable social capital because it deals directly 
with the client.153 When the corporate client hires an offshore vendor 
directly, the offshore worker may have greater access to this social 
                                                                                                                            
145. Id. at 2087 (noting that “companies hope to leverage their status as a ‘trophy client’ to 
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capital.154 Finally, symbolic capital includes measures of status and the 
“authority to judge outcomes.”155 Symbolic capital most often resides with 
the outsourcing client, though balancing the power inherent in symbolic 
capital will likely improve the quality of the outsourcing relationship.156 
B. Organizational Behavior Theory 
The socioeconomic theories discussed above are helpful in 
understanding some of the parties’ differing incentives, capabilities, and 
resources in the outsourcing relationship. But these aspects, which depend 
heavily on rational choice, are insufficient to explain why outsourcing 
projects succeed or fail.157 Organizational and psychological factors also 
play a large role in explaining the outcome of outsourcing projects. This 
section examines theories from organizational behavior and social 
psychology to look more closely at the human side of the outsourcing 
process. 
Organizational behavior studies human behavior and psychology within 
the situational and institutional setting.158 It can help fill some of the gaps in 
traditional economic theory, which has been criticized for its “narrow view 
of rationality” and inattention to ethical norms.159 In this section, I examine 
three particular ways in which the human element interacts with 
organizations in the outsourcing process. First, social exchange theory helps 
explain how parties to a contract engage each other over time, attempting to 
create balance and mutuality.160 Second, research on the psychological 
contract describes how employees’ unspoken assumptions and expectations 
can influence the quality of the work they perform.161 Third, the concepts of 
exit, voice, and loyalty can help illuminate how employees will react when 
problems arise.162  
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1. Social Exchange Theory 
Social Exchange Theory focuses on the relationship between actors—
either firms or individuals—over time.163 It defines “social exchange” as 
“the voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they 
are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from others.”164 Social 
exchange theory assumes that people will, over time, act in ways that 
maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative ones.165 It further 
assumes that the relationship arises from “mutual dependence”—that is, 
“both parties have some reason to engage in exchange to obtain resources of 
value.”  
Four concepts underlie social exchange theory. The first, reciprocity, 
focuses on the mutuality of benefit.166 The second, balance, examines how 
dependent each actor is on the other—a condition that is likely to change 
over time.167 Cohesion, the third factor, measures the strength of the 
relationship and its ability to survive conflict.168 Finally, the fourth factor, 
power-balancing, arises from the assumption that “actors are motivated to 
maintain or increase their power in exchange relations to increase benefits 
and to minimize losses.”169 
Social exchange theory is useful in analyzing outsourcing relationships 
over time. Although the practice of legal offshoring is still relatively young, 
the field is characterized by ongoing relationships. Approximately seventy 
percent of offshoring contracts in general are renewed,170 and clients’ 
overall satisfaction with legal outsourcing relationships suggests that most 
outsourcing relationships will continue past the initial contract. The 
complexity of the legal services performed grows as the relationship 
lengthens. Companies typically start out with simpler contracts for simpler 
services that grow over time as the client develops trust in the vendor.171 
Social exchange theory’s discussion of “mutual dependence” applies 
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forcefully in the outsourcing context, where scholars report that trust on 
both sides is critical to the ongoing relationship:  
Clients need to trust their providers with regard to desired quality 
and timing of service delivery, maintenance of confidentiality and 
security of inside information, and non-display of opportunistic 
behavior that might lead to loss of control over the outsourced 
activity or even double outsourcing that involves subcontracting 
work elsewhere for additional profits. Likewise, providers need to 
trust their clients in the matters of demand stability, timely 
payment of contract amounts, release of promised incentives, and 
adherence to ethical and legal standards particularly when disputes 
arise.172  
When two contracting parties focus on long-term strategies, each has “an 
incentive to invest in the long-term health of the other.”173 But in order to 
make the long-term relationship work, both parties must avoid short-term 
opportunism in the interest of developing a longer-term beneficial 
alliance.174 
2. The Psychological Contract 
While the theories described above focus on the relationship of the two 
firms involved in the outsourcing process, other theories focus more 
attention on the individual employees involved in the process. These 
employees are critical to the success of any outsourcing venture. Thus, the 
next two subsections focus on the relationship between the employees and 
the firms that employ them. 
Organizational behavior theory suggests that all employees—whether 
full-time, part-time, or contract employees—form unwritten “psychological 
contracts” with their employer.175 When the employer does not share the 
same understanding, conflict can arise. Thus, such a psychological contract 
for temporary employees may include the possibility of being hired on full-
time once the employees have proved their skills.176 Likewise, full-time 
employees may have an expectation that their jobs will be secure as long as 
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they perform competent work, and this conception may be threatened when 
they see the organization hiring contingent workers.177 When there are 
multiple employers involved in a contract, “employees may face conflicting 
psychological contracts with each employer,”178 as the employers may have 
different expectations of the employee and may have conflicting interests in 
regard to the employee.179 
In outsourcing, the psychological contract comes into play among 
employees of both onshore and offshore entities. Onshore, many young 
attorneys are worried about the stability of their jobs. They have seen 
numerous rounds of layoffs, and may feel that their jobs are threatened by 
international outsourcing.180 Attorneys working offshore are likely to 
internalize the psychological contract differently.181 Full-time offshore 
employees, like their onshore counterparts, may expect stable work, reliable 
hours, and opportunities to advance into a management role.182 Contingent 
contract workers hired overseas, by contrast, may or may not have the same 
expectations. 
The psychological contract depends upon cultural variations potentially 
affected by outsourcing. An employee may, for example, expect to be 
accorded respect according to age. At least one LPO provider specifically 
notes that such an expectation will not necessarily bear out in practice: an 
executive noted that “designations are not proportional to age but only to 
merit and performance. A 40-year-old may have to report to a 27-year-old, 
depending on their individual experiences and performance in the company. 
. . . It’s more like the work culture in the West.”183 While this arrangement 
promotes flexibility, it may also cause employees to feel discomfort when 
the unstated psychological contract is violated. 
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3. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
Albert Hirschman famously observed that there are two main ways 
actors can deal with dissatisfaction in an ongoing relationship: exit (leaving 
employment) and voice (articulating discontent in order to promote 
change).184 He notes that voice can act as an alternative to exit or a 
complement to it; exit may be a last resort after voicing discontent failed to 
achieve the desired changes.185 Loyalty will affect how those choices play 
out; according to Hirschman, “as a rule . . . loyalty holds exit at bay and 
activates voice.”186 
Research on outsourcing arrangements suggests that the arrangements 
affect employees’ decision to engage in both “exit” and “voice.”187 For 
example, researchers found that when workforces were blended, so that 
standard full-time employees worked side-by-side with contingent 
employees, the blending “worsened relations between managers and 
employees, decreased standard employees’ loyalty, and increased their 
interest both in leaving their organizations and in exercising voice through 
unionization.”188 While these results would not necessarily carry over into 
the offshoring context where there is greater distance between the different 
types of employees, it is possible that offshoring would lead to a similar 
result. As other scholars have pointed out, outsourcing can be a “subtle 
reminder to employees [of the client firm] of their potentially uncertain job 
status.”189 Employee satisfaction—and options for exercising 
dissatisfaction—should be considered both at the client and vendor level 
when engaging in outsourcing agreements. 
The exit/voice/loyalty relationship can also interact with the 
psychological contract. When employees’ unstated expectations are not 
met, employees are less likely to feel loyal to the employer. Again, such 
expectations can vary by culture. Because attorneys in the United States are 
acculturated to associate the practice of law with prestige and power, an 
employment relationship that breaches this expectation may engender 
negative feelings. One attorney who worked as a temporary employee doing 
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document review at a major U.S. law firm reported feeling subjugated and 
belittled by the employment conditions at the firm: 
The environment here is god-awful—literally. We have 10 
people in a room of less than 200 square feet of space. It’s in the 
middle of the floor where “real people” actually walk by and stare. 
It’s almost as though we’re looked at as animals. I could go on 
and on, but I need to hit my number of docs per hour just so I can 
keep my “legal” job.190 
Similar work conditions at an Indian LPO may be interpreted very 
differently. As noted above, the practice of law does not carry the same 
expectation of prestige and power that it does in the U.S.191 In addition, 
Indian attorneys working at LPOs may value different aspects of the 
document review job. To LPO employees, the positions offer relatively 
good salaries by Indian standards, maintain “a corporate atmosphere that 
[i]s ‘safe’ for women,” and offer a coveted opportunity to perform “global” 
work while developing transferable skill sets.192 As a result, document 
review work may fulfill the psychological contract for Indian employees 
while not fulfilling it for American employees—thus creating higher 
satisfaction and loyalty in India. 
Finally, exit, voice, and loyalty can come into play at the client/vendor 
level as well. Just as an employee can choose to leave employment, so too 
can a client choose whether to renew a contract with the legal services 
vendor. When problems arise, will the client voice dissatisfaction? And will 
the vendor respond to the client’s concerns in a way that encourages the 
contractual relationship to continue? Loyalty, built over time and through 
close communication, may encourage the client to voice concerns without 
exiting the contractual relationship. 
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III. SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON LEGAL OFFSHORING 
The theoretical constructs described in the prior section can help 
understand many of the dynamics at play in the offshore outsourcing 
relationship, but situational influences are equally important, and often 
overlooked.193 Scholars have adopted an approach called “situationism” to 
examine the power of the external environment and circumstances to 
influence behavior. Situationism “challenges the notion that ethical 
behavior is primarily the work of good character . . . . [and] instead suggests 
that behavior is highly context-dependent and often differs based on what 
seem to be trivial differences between one situation and another.”194 
Likewise, the impact of outsourcing on lawyers’ ethical duties of 
competence, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest will be significantly 
influenced by the situational context in which legal services are rendered.  
While the prior section focused on general risks of contracting within the 
legal services industry, this section focuses on risks that arise from the 
particular context of offshore outsourcing. It first examines the benefits and 
costs of three different models of allocating responsibility. Second, it 
examines risks that arise from varying employment contexts and conditions. 
Finally, it analyzes problems that can arise from cross-cultural status and 
hierarchy differences with the outsourcing process.  
A. Allocation of Responsibility 
When legal work is outsourced, it is also disaggregated by necessity. 
Instead of having a single lawyer—or even a single law firm—responsible 
for the legal work in its entirety, outsourcing means that part of the legal 
work will be separated and performed elsewhere. Thus, by definition, there 
will be some diffusion of responsibility. How this responsibility is allocated 
will affect the organizational dynamics involved in the provision of legal 
services, thereby affecting the overall quality of those services. This section 
examines the most common models for allocation of responsibility and 
analyzes costs and benefits of each model. 
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1. The Law-Firm Quarterback Model 
In the “quarterback” model, the corporate client relies heavily on an 
outside law firm to direct the outsourcing process. This model, especially 
popular in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, puts the law firm in a 
“quarterback” or “foreman” role.195 The law firm functions as an 
intermediary between clients and LPO firms, directing the legal 
representation and ensuring that each piece of the representation is handled 
by the provider best suited to complete the work. Some law firms may set 
up a captive center offshore, while others work with independent vendors.196 
Having the law firm take this central role helps to improve the coordination 
of legal services by ensuring that legal strategy is directed by a central 
source.  
Having a law firm quarterbacking the outsourcing arrangement can 
mediate some of the agency costs. The client, for example, wants to reduce 
expenses, while the LPO provider wants to maximize revenue. As between 
the LPO vendor and the client, the law firm can be in a more neutral 
position, able to direct assignments, monitor productivity, and evaluate 
work product.197 The model is also more expensive, however, because the 
client must pay the onshore firm for the time spent coordinating and 
supervising these services. 
2. The Corporate Extension Model 
In the “extension” model, often also called a “captive center” model, 
corporate law departments work directly with offshore legal professionals, 
viewing them as an extension of the in-house legal department.198 Under 
this model, offshore workers are generally employed directly by a corporate 
subsidiary, as in the GE case.199 Furthermore, there is still one overarching 
organization, and it is not unreasonable to consider the offshore site an 
extension of the corporate legal department.  
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The corporate extension model cuts some of the costs present in the law 
firm quarterback model, as the client does not have to pay for an onshore 
law firm to coordinate services. The corporate extension model may also 
enhance communication between the corporate client and offshore workers, 
as there are fewer layers between the client and the legal service 
professionals, and there is more likely to be a continuously ongoing 
relationship between the corporation and its offshore partner. In this sense, 
the client is able to realize the advantages of resource-dependence—because 
the subsidiary is fully dependent on a single corporate client, it will be 
maximally responsive to client’s needs.200 On the other hand, the extension 
model may be available only to the largest corporate clients, as it requires 
large economies of scale for a company to independently recruit, train, and 
employ offshore employees.  
3. The Service-Provider Model 
Under the “service-provider” model, corporations will contract with a 
third-party LPO vendor. In this model, the corporate client pays somewhat 
more to hire an intermediary firm to hire and train offshore employees. This 
model has the benefit of familiarity; the corporation has most likely used a 
service-provider model in other contexts, such as contracting for software 
development, printing services, and other business operations.201  
The service-provider model may offer greater flexibility to corporate 
clients. The corporation will not need to sustain its own offshore workforce, 
but can instead hire only the hours of labor needed from the LPO vendor. 
This flexibility is offset by substantial supervision responsibilities, however. 
Because the legal service providers are neither directly employed by the 
corporate client nor supervised by outside counsel, the general counsel’s 
office will have to undertake the burden of supervising the legal services.202  
B. Working Conditions of LPO Professionals 
When a client hires an LPO firm to provide legal services, it is likely to 
focus primary attention on the firm itself—its consideration of LPO 
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employees may be limited to verifying their credentials and experience.203 
Nevertheless, the employment conditions of LPO employees can 
significantly affect the legal services offered. Employee working conditions 
that contravene social norms may lead to emotional distress and breakdown 
of working relations.204 This breakdown, in turn, can shift the 
exit/voice/loyalty calculation, ultimately affecting compliance with ethical 
duties. 
Even non-malicious employment decisions such as hiring temporary 
rather than permanent employees can lead to consequences that ultimately 
harm client interests. As one LPO professional noted, utilizing contract 
employees can raise the risks of disclosure of confidences and can open the 
door to conflicts of interest.205 Because the contract employees suffer 
periods of unemployment between jobs, and because they also migrate 
between LPO providers who might be hired by opposing parties, the 
employees may have incentives to share confidential information: 
In such a situation, a contract employee learning of a defense 
tactic employed by the defendant in a particular litigation, might 
well be tempted to disclose the same to the opposite party in the 
same litigation or in a subsequent suit, if he happens to be working 
subsequently in an LPO that is handling litigation for that opposite 
party.206 
If employees had an expectation of continued employment that was not 
borne out in practice, they may feel betrayed when additional work is not 
forthcoming and thus believe they are justified in behaving 
opportunistically. In this regard, it may matter whether the contingent 
employee was hired with a particular end date to the contract; without such 
an anticipated end date, the employee may have a greater psychological 
expectation that work will continue.207 The employer need not have created 
such an expectation of future work; it may have been part of the employee’s 
unarticulated psychological contract.208  
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Similar breaches of confidential information have been threatened by 
contract workers involved in other types of outsourcing. For example, one 
contract worker in Pakistan threatened to post patient health records online 
if a San Francisco hospital failed to pay her for medical transcription 
services.209 Interestingly, the hospital had not offshored the transcription 
work—but it did outsource it to a Florida vendor.210 The Florida vendor 
then allegedly subcontracted the work to a man in Texas, who then hired the 
contractor in Pakistan, and failed to pay for the work performed.211 In this 
case, the employee’s opportunistic—and damaging—behavior was not 
caused by the breach of an underlying psychological contract, but rather by 
the breach of an explicit contract, when the worker was not paid as 
promised. 
Unauthorized disclosure in legal offshoring is rare, and LPO vendors’ 
strict controls on the information provided to employees reduce some of the 
risk of such disclosure. It is typical for the LPO firms to institute 
mechanical controls on employee access to confidential information; at 
Evalueserve, one of the larger firms, “employee computers don’t have 
functional USB ports. All paper in the office is color coded, and employees 
aren’t allowed to take even bits of paper out of the office.”212 
These mechanical controls are a type of agency cost; they allow parties 
to minimize the risk of ethical breaches by adding monitoring costs that 
control employee access to information.213 The control may also contribute 
to the client/vendor relationship over time. As long as the controls are 
consistently implemented and effective, they may aid the process of 
building mutual trust between client and vendor.214  
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What these controls cannot accomplish, however, is to secure the 
employee’s loyalty. With such strict controls in place, the employees may 
feel that they are not trusted, and may have no personal stake in 
contributing to the relationship. In such a case, the employer’s attention to 
the psychological contract takes on an even more important role. If the 
employee expects stable employment, he or she may feel betrayed if the 
LPO employer terminates employees when work is slow—and that sense of 
betrayal may diminish loyalty, increasing the risk that the employee will 
take action adverse to the employer’s interest. For this reason, at least one 
LPO professional recommends that firms hire full-time employees “whose 
loyalties are secured.”215  
C. Status Barriers 
As noted above, some LPOs are hiring U.S.-licensed attorneys to provide 
quality review before outsourced work is delivered to the client.216 While 
such an organizational structure may increase client comfort,217 it may also 
exacerbate perceived disparities in status; LPO employees may feel 
uncomfortable if they perceive “US and UK attorneys metamorphosing into 
top management honchos overnight:”218 
US and UK attorneys who would never otherwise have 
dreamed of visiting the Orient are making a beeline for India and 
China and happily playing leading roles in LPOs. At home, they 
would probably still be struggling juniors, serving summonses and 
recording EBTs. Here, they manage large teams of Indian lawyers 
and head ambitious projects. Their salaries may not be as high as 
what they might have earned in the US even at the lowest rung of 
their careers, but the lower cost of living both in India and China 
more than makes up for that. Furthermore, LPOs in India are 
based in metros where the standard of living can be even more 
lavish than abroad, what with malls, multiplexes, and in-house 
help for every chore.219 
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In general, scholars report that the legal profession in India does not 
possess the same prestige that it does in the United States.220 Specifically, 
they have noted a “prevailing disparity in this field” as “lawyers in the top 
bracket are becoming increasingly wealthy even by international standards” 
while the “vast majority are struggling to make both ends meet despite 
being otherwise competent.”221 
Indian attorneys who work for LPOs, however, tend to be at the higher 
end of the spectrum. Many LPOs report that they hire only from the top 
twenty law schools in India—given that there are more than 500 law 
schools in the country, this is quite a small fraction.222 Thus, working 
closely with U.S.-licensed attorneys may cause discomfort, especially when 
“[t]he salaries paid to these attorneys are invariably twice and thrice what an 
Indian lawyer is paid for the same job.”223 
These pay disparities lead to status disparities. Outsourcing research 
from other industries has found that even when offshore salaries were high 
for their locality, those salaries were still “miniscule compared to the 
salaries of onshore people.”224 The onshore/offshore disparities led to a 
“perception of onshore participants” that “low pay was associated with low 
status,” leading onshore participants to view their offshore partners “as 
cheap, low quality worker-bees who could be ordered around.”225 
Such status barriers can be even greater when combined with pre-
existing prejudice on the part of onshore clients: 
I can vouch that . . . Indian lawyers are performing as well and in 
some cases better than their US counterparts. What is really 
dampening is that where both US and Indian lawyers happen to be 
working on the same matter, the US lawyer automatically assumes 
that any error in the case is the work of the India team. Maybe he 
has reason. But what is worse is that the Indian team is quite 
willing to assume that somehow it must be their fault. This, I 
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think, is the effect of years of British rule which has left us with a 
definite inferiority complex.226 
Research on the psychological contract and on exit, voice, and loyalty 
suggests that these status barriers will be most keenly felt when U.S. and 
Indian attorneys work side-by-side. Just as the presence of contingent 
employees reminded the permanent employees that their employment 
arrangement was fragile,227 so too can the presence of U.S. attorneys change 
the frames of reference for Indian attorneys. An LPO salary that appears 
excellent in light of the salaries earned by law school classmates228 may not 
seem quite as good when compared to the much higher salaries of U.S. 
attorneys doing the same or similar work.  
Some elements of the status disparity may be a necessary cost of doing 
business; after all, supervision of the work by U.S. attorneys is required by 
the ethics opinions approving outsourcing arrangements.229 Nevertheless, 
both vendor and client should be aware of the possibility of employee 
discomfort, and should try to minimize status barriers when possible. At a 
minimum, both the client and the vendor should be aware of the dangers of 
implicit bias,230 and should be wary of too quickly assigning blame to the 
non-U.S. employees. Other strategies for minimizing the negative effect of 
status barriers on collaboration are discussed more fully in Part IV.B. 
IV. SHIFTING FRAMES OF REFERENCE: FROM DISAGGREGATION TO 
COLLABORATION 
As discussed in the prior sections, understanding the socioeconomic and 
organizational theories related to outsourcing can help predict where risks 
will arise from differing incentives in the contracting process.231 
Understanding the situational context of legal outsourcing can help predict 
risks that arise from gaps in the allocation of responsibility or from cultural 
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misunderstandings.232 Once potential risks have been identified, the parties 
to the outsourcing process can take steps to minimize those risks. 
Successful outsourcing has been said to require “good communications 
skills, along with the ability to motivate workers from different 
organizations, negotiate and administer service contracts, assemble effective 
teams, and plan for and respond to contingencies.”233 Each of these skills is 
undoubtedly important: a client that focuses only on the financial cost of 
outsourcing will miss important factors that influence the ultimate success 
or failure of the legal venture. To integrate consideration of those 
organizational and personal factors, this section recommends that clients 
considering offshoring legal services move from a disaggregation model to 
a collaboration model. It argues that a collaborative model can better align 
incentives, improve working conditions, smooth cultural differences, and 
thereby improve the quality and effectiveness of outsourced legal services. 
A. The Disaggregation Model 
Legal outsourcing began with disaggregation: discrete tasks were carved 
out of the overall legal representation and sent off-site, first to contract 
attorneys in the United States, and more recently to other countries.234 
Recently, a number of articles have begun to examine the disaggregation 
phenomenon generally, offering a definition of the practice and general 
insight into the disaggregation process.235 Disaggregation involves the 
(usually sophisticated) client “break[ing] legal representations into pieces 
and assign[ing] responsibility for different tasks to an appropriate service 
provider.”236 Clients view disaggregation as a way to cut costs, but also as a 
way to increase specialization, sending discrete tasks to the provider best 
able to manage that particular piece of the process. For example, the client 
might contract with a specialized e-discovery firm to process electronically-
stored information for discovery.237 Disaggregation also involves an 
element of what Richard Susskind has termed “commoditization of legal 
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services”—the idea that “a legal service or offering is very readily available 
in the market, often from a variety of sources, and certainly at a highly 
competitive price. . . . a raw material that can be sourced from one of 
various suppliers.”238 
Outsourcing itself cannot exist without some disaggregation and 
commodification of legal services, as multiple parties are necessarily 
involved in the provision of those services. But the disaggregation model is 
more psychological than structural. It assumes an outlook in which each 
legal provider will function independently and autonomously. In the words 
of a legal services director at an Indian LPO, firms would be “perceived as 
product suppliers/vendors,” instead of being perceived as “service 
providers.”239 The disaggregation model focuses on the ultimate product, 
such as a completed document review, a contract database, or a legal brief, 
rather than the process that created that product.  
Disaggregation as an organizational model of legal service is larger than 
disaggregation as a component of outsourcing. The disaggregation model 
comes into play when responsibility is diffused between various legal 
service providers, with each operating autonomously.240 Even without any 
offshore participation, large-scale litigation is likely to be disaggregated 
into various components.241 Responsibility is often divided between 
“national, regional, and local representation, in addition to in-house counsel 
participation.”242 
Because of its focus on autonomy, the disaggregation model leaves open 
gaps in the chain of responsibility.243 When mistakes occur—such as when a 
party fails to disclose relevant material in discovery—it can be difficult to 
ascertain who is responsible for the lapse.244 The attorney responsible for 
signing the discovery disclosure may be subject to sanctions, but that 
attorney might be local counsel hired for court appearances, and might not 
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have been involved in the decisionmaking that led to the failure to disclose 
requested information.245 
The disaggregation model can also lead to opportunistic behavior. With 
multiple parties involved, there may be incentives to “skirt the rules” 
knowing that someone else is more likely to be held responsible.246 Both 
innocent mistakes and unchecked opportunistic behavior are part of the 
residual loss predicted by transaction cost theory—they are costs that are 
not allocated by the parties’ contract.  
The problems of disaggregation are magnified when legal work is sent 
offshore. Overseas service providers may not obtain feedback on the quality 
or success of their work; employees may not have stable employment or 
feel loyalty to either client or employer; status barriers may further inhibit 
loyalty.247 Each of these difficulties increases the transaction costs of the 
outsourcing arrangement.248 Increased monitoring, bonding, and policing 
expenditures may offset some of those costs, but cannot, by themselves, 
increase employee loyalty or provide the balanced social exchanges needed 
to build a strong client/vendor relationship. 
B. The Collaboration Model 
Moving toward a model of collaboration allows parties to obtain some of 
the advantages of disaggregation while reducing the risks that arise from 
gaps in the chain of responsibility. Within the practice of law, three primary 
types of collaboration have been identified: lawyer to lawyer; lawyer to 
client; client to client.249 The outsourcing process largely focuses on the first 
two models, though there is some room for all three.  
In lawyer-to-lawyer collaboration, the corporate client’s outside law firm 
may collaborate with offshore attorneys at an LPO vendor. Both onshore 
counsel and offshore LPO firm act as agents in carrying out the client’s 
legal instruction, and both collaborate together to ensure that the client’s 
needs are met. In lawyer-to-client collaboration, the client (usually, in the 
outsourcing realm, the corporate general counsel) will collaborate with 
outside legal services providers, whether onshore, offshore, or both. And 
finally, in client-to-client collaboration, clients may discuss their legal needs 
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with each other.250 While direct economic competitors may not want to 
share competitive advantages, general counsel in non-competing firms may 
be willing to share some information about their experience with offshoring, 
possibly by recommending particular providers or by sharing cautionary 
tales. Finally, vendors of legal outsourcing services also share general 
information, news, and strategies for best practices through networking 
forums.251 
Under a collaborative model of outsourcing, work would still be 
disaggregated in the sense that it is shared among various legal services 
providers, both on- and off-shore. But unlike the disaggregation model’s 
focus on autonomy and independent work, the collaborative model would 
focus on cooperation, communication, and negotiation of status and 
resources.252 While these activities may appear relatively uncontroversial, 
they are often overlooked by the disaggregation model—and this exclusion 
leads less to effective legal representation. 
1. Cooperation 
A focus on cooperation would assist the client, the outsourcing vendor, 
and (if involved in the transaction) outside counsel in developing a stronger 
relationship over time. Social exchange theory suggests that maintaining a 
balanced, mutual relationship will assist the parties in maximizing positive 
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outcomes.253 The more confidence the parties have in the relationship, the 
more they are willing to continue it.254  
Cooperation begins with the choice of outsourcing partner. As noted, 
resource dependence theory suggests that vendors will be more responsive 
to clients who provide significant resources.255 A large corporation with a 
correspondingly large outsourcing budget may find many vendors that meet 
its needs. Smaller companies, on the other hand, may do better with more 
specialized outsourcing vendors. 
Cost alone should not drive the choice of vendor. A client focused on 
disaggregation may be more likely to choose a vendor based only on cost 
and formal qualifications—after all, if the vendor is expected to work 
autonomously, competence and cost may be the most important factors.256 
For a one-time contract, price and basic competence may be of overriding 
importance. However, when contracting opportunities extend over time 
between repeat players, social exchange theory suggests that the parties’ 
mutual dependence precludes such a narrow focus.  
David Wilkins reports that Chrysler experienced a similar phenomenon 
in purchasing automotive components.257 When Chrysler purchased from 
the lowest bidder “with little attention to prior history or performance,” it 
maintained supplier relationships “characterized by mutual distrust and 
suspicion.”258 When Chrysler shifted to a model that allowed long-term 
contracts based on performance and adopted pricing models based in part 
on sustainable profits for suppliers, the company was able to reduce overall 
costs and improve supplier performance.259 The lesson for outsourcing 
participants is that long-term cooperation may matter even more than short-
term costs. In choosing legal service providers, the client should look 
beyond bid price to other factors that go into that relationship, ideally 
choosing a vendor that can act as a partner—not just a product supplier.  
Once the contract has been signed, cooperation should continue. At a 
basic level, power dynamics favor the client. After all, the client controls 
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the outsourcing budget and chooses a vendor to hire. As social-exchange 
theory suggests, however, one-sided power dynamics are not stable. If the 
relationship continues over a longer term, the parties will take actions to 
balance power within the contracting relationship.260 
Clients can assist that power-smoothing by giving “voice” to their 
offshore counterparts and by treating them as partners in collaboration. A 
recent study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers looked at shared elements of 
successful outsourcing arrangements and found certain characteristics to be 
particularly important.261 Unsurprisingly, parties to successful outsourcing 
were likely to report that their dealings with each other were “honest and 
transparent.”262 In addition, particular measures of collaboration also ranked 
highly.263 More than half the respondents reported that “[m]atters of mutual 
interest [were] decided jointly,” and forty percent reported that their “[j]oint 
governance structures [were] working effectively.”264 Smaller, but still 
significant, numbers of respondents also reported that “[r]isks and rewards 
[were] shared” (31%) and “[s]uppliers [were] proactively innovative” 
(27%).265 Again, learning from the Chrysler experience, regularly meeting 
with suppliers and establishing mechanisms by which the suppliers could 
provide advice “produce[d] impressive dividends.”266 These techniques can 
be applied in the legal services context as well; contract negotiations should 
be transparent, with both parties participating in joint decisionmaking, and 
both parties bearing some of the risk and reaping potential reward. 
Clients should also encourage proactive innovation from legal service 
suppliers. In spite of their experience and knowledge, outsourcing vendors 
across industries are rarely asked for feedback about improving the 
outsourcing process.267 One study found a “subtle but universal status 
difference” between offshore and onshore participants in the outsourcing 
process, in which “offshore participants were never asked to judge the 
quality of the collaboration or the quality of the systems that were 
developed” and “were never asked to report on the vendor’s view of the 
how the project was going.”268 On one occasion when feedback was offered, 
“useful design suggestions were ignored as offshore developers were 
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thought to be uninformed about the business.”269 This failure to seek input 
from offshore participants may arise from ethnocentrism and implicit 
cultural biases.270 Because these failures operate unconsciously,271 
outsourcing clients should institutionalize processes for seeking feedback 
from offshore partners.272 
2. Communication 
Communication between all the parties involved in the outsourcing 
relationship is one of the most important aspects of a successful outsourcing 
arrangement. It is likely to enhance the long-term relationship of client and 
vendor by increasing cohesion and ensuring reciprocity.273 It is thereby 
likely to promote employee loyalty and improve the overall quality of legal 
services rendered. Empirical work has confirmed the importance of 
communication in outsourcing within the information technology sector. 
One recent study found that an outsourcing client “can increase vendor’s 
trust and thus improve customer relationship and project quality by ensuring 
effective communication and increasing the range and depth of information 
transfer.”274 
In spite of these advantages, some LPO professionals report that clients 
do not always expect to engage in two-way communication.275 In particular, 
clients may not expect to engage in further communication after their 
offshore partners complete assignments.276 When clients do update LPO 
providers on the results of their work, however, the offshore attorneys 
report that it is extremely helpful.277 One attorney reported that her team had 
worked for a client performing patent invalidity searches, and noted that the 
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attorneys “were often able to find documents that seemed to prove elements 
of a patent invalid.”278 Because the clients never updated LPO providers on 
the status of the matter after those searches, “they never knew if their work 
stood up in court.”279 The attorney’s current employer, by contrast, offers 
such updates within the training process.280 
Sometimes the disaggregated nature of legal offshoring makes it difficult 
for offshore attorneys to understand the larger picture behind the work they 
are doing. But a sense of the ultimate goal can help even in basic tasks like 
document review. As one LPO manager reported, attorneys who understand 
the nature of the project will have a better sense of how to avoid mistakes: 
[I]n order for the quality procedures to be put in place, this first 
step of getting the team to recognize what is an error for that 
particular process, is vital. . . . I realized that the team was not 
really aware of what the process was all about. They were merely 
performing the tasks told like automatons without the faintest idea 
of why they were doing it. An explanation of the whys and 
wherefores of client requirements serves to bring the team to an 
understanding of why a particular document needs to be done in a 
particular manner. Once the team sees the reason and logic in the 
work they are engaged in, they can then see for themselves what 
the client means when she cries ‘error.’281 
Taking the time to provide feedback and communication about offshored 
work may be viewed as an additional cost for the client that is added to the 
already-existing monitoring costs. However, it is a cost that may reduce 
other transaction costs, especially if it increases the overall quality of the 
work over time. Such communication may also help in the relationship-
building realm; given how many offshore outsourcing contracts are renewed 
after their expiration, it makes some sense to pay attention to the long-term 
relationship of the client and vendor. Furthermore, such individual feedback 
may help ensure that offshore employees feel that they are valued by the 
client, thus increasing overall loyalty and reducing the likelihood that 
disgruntled employees will engage in harmful acts, such as breaching 
confidentiality.282  
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3. Negotiating Status and Resources 
Moving toward a collaborative model will require all parties in the 
outsourcing relationship to renegotiate relative status and resources. Social 
exchange theory tells us that parties in a business relationship will engage in 
power balancing over time in order to stabilize the relationship.283 Within 
the outsourcing context, actively working toward such power balancing can 
improve the parties’ collaboration and thus improve quality outcomes.284 
Status and power are closely related.285 In the outsourcing context, 
however, onshore workers are typically viewed as having higher status than 
offshore workers.286 Improving collaboration requires that these status 
differences be smoothed out. One outsourcing manager in the banking 
industry stressed that, due to cultural prejudices, onshore employees 
sometimes “want to treat Indians as second class citizens” and that much of 
his job was to “make sure that did not occur” because allowing such status 
differences to affect the project would destroy offshore employees’ 
innovation.287 This reaction may result from the unspoken psychological 
contract: when onshore clients demonstrate respect for the intellectual 
contributions of their offshore partners, offshore employees perceive such 
contributions to be a valued part of the employment contract. When such 
contributions are not valued, they will not become part of the psychological 
contract, regardless of what the written contract may say. 
Negotiating status also requires attention to the elements of the 
psychological contract that may vary by culture. For example, employees 
may have very different expectations about how deeply managers should 
become involved in the day-to-day work. One observer who spent time in 
England, France, and India, found that “in London and Paris, the team hated 
interference from a manager,” as the team members “wanted to be steered 
in the right direction and then just left alone to get on with their work.”288 In 
India, on the other hand, “the same tactic created a group of disgruntled 
colleagues who felt that their manager was distant and uninterested.”289 
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Thus, management strategies aimed at empowering employees requires 
sensitivity to these cultural differences. 
There is a risk, however, that sensitivity to cultural management styles 
will bleed over into cultural bias and a hardening of status differences. 
Cultural stereotypes can provide a convenient excuse for collaborative 
failures on both sides.290 One outsourcing study of software development 
found that “[i]t was easy for onshore developers to say their Indian 
colleagues failed to collaborate because ‘they were expect[ing] to be spoon-
fed specifications’ and for the Indian participants to blame failure on poorly 
specified requirements from onshore ‘higher-ups.’”291  
Acknowledging cultural differences without resorting to stereotypes 
requires some amount of cultural blending.292 Cultural blending represents 
“an effort to create shared values, norms, and beliefs and is considered a 
critical element of control in offshore outsourcing.”293 Outsourcing 
managers can use symbolic capital (“the power to name things and institute 
an order among things”) to negotiate these boundaries.294 In one case, 
“stereotypical descriptions of attitudes to authority in India and Russia 
exhibited themselves when the individuals in question insisted on 
maintaining them rather than reflecting upon them to arrive at joint 
norms.”295 However, as the parties collaborated over time with each other, 
“collaborative projects led to the accumulation of shared capital.”296 
Successful managers played a key role in developing this shared capital; 
they were “willing and able to use the economic, intellectual, social, and 
symbolic capital they ha[d] accumulated to renegotiate status 
hierarchies.”297 They used the “symbolic significance” of their management 
positions to encourage collaborative attitudes, used their technical 
competence to train onshore and offshore team members and develop their 
intellectual capital, used financial resources to integrate team members 
through visits and meetings, and drew on social connections to assist in the 
process.298 Such a renegotiation of status and resource requires significant 
effort, but reciprocal visits, cultural immersion, and training aid the process 
of cultural blending across the onshore and offshore team members.299  
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C. Barriers to Collaboration 
Although a collaborative model of outsourcing has significant 
advantages over the disaggregation model, it is subject to criticism in 
several respects. First, some industry participants have a sense that 
collaboration may be unnecessary for more straightforward, repetitive tasks 
such as first-level document review300—the type of work that, in Susskind’s 
terms, is already “commoditized.”301 Certainly, low-level work (still 85% of 
the non-IP legal outsourcing field302) may require a lower degree of 
collaboration than more complex legal research and drafting. But while it is 
true that tasks such as document review can be carried out much more 
autonomously than brief writing or legal strategy, even commoditized work 
can benefit from a collaborative perspective, as parties work together to fit 
the commoditized work within the broader legal strategy. As the employees 
of outsourcing firms have noted, they can do better work when they 
understand the context in which they are doing it.303 Collaboration in 
document review, database management, or administrative support tasks 
may involve simply communicating the nature of the project, listening when 
the vendor offers suggestions, and providing feedback regarding the client’s 
level of satisfaction with the work. The collaborative activity does not have 
to be extensive or time-consuming—even these minor actions can improve 
the overall representation. 
A more significant problem with the collaboration model is financial: 
adopting a collaborative model may raise concerns about shared malpractice 
liability for negligent representation. As one commentator has pointed out, 
an explicit disaggregation model that clearly “spell[s] out . . . the division of 
responsibilities” of the various parties may insulate against claims of joint 
or vicarious liability.304 When the client hires the outsourcing firm, the risk 
of vicarious liability may be lessened.305 However, when the U.S. counsel 
performs a more collaborative “quarterbacking” function,306 directing the 
legal strategy and determining which party (inside counsel, U.S. counsel, or 
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an LPO vendor) should perform the various components, then the risk of 
vicarious liability may be greater.  
Transaction cost theory suggests that this risk can be managed by 
“tighten[ing] control through well-designed contracts.”307 The potential 
liability risk is one cost of the outsourcing relationship. Because the 
corporate client benefits from greater collaboration among legal service 
providers, it may be willing to contract for a malpractice exclusion that 
limits liability only for the individual party’s negligence or misconduct. To 
the extent that outside counsel plays a significant role in directing the 
outsourcing activity, it should request such a contract provision. 
Finally, another risk of the collaborative model is that U.S. corporations’ 
“collaboration” with offshore entities will be viewed by the American 
public in the term’s pejorative sense.308 Those with a protectionist ideology 
may view collaborative outsourcing as “traitorous cooperation.”309 And 
indeed, attorneys who believe their jobs to be at risk from outsourcing have 
used just this rhetoric to describe other U.S. attorneys in the outsourcing 
business.310 Even former presidential candidate John Kerry referred to 
businesses that engage in offshore outsourcing as “‘Benedict Arnold’ 
companies and CEOs,” in a reference to the famous traitor of the American 
Revolutionary War.311 Perhaps in response to some of these concerns, 
companies and law firms involved in offshore outsourcing have kept their 
efforts quiet.312 In a recent survey of large law firms, eighty-three percent 
refused to say whether they had engaged in offshore outsourcing.313 
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In the long run, however, it seems unlikely that legal outsourcing will 
significantly harm the reputations of either corporate clients or the law firms 
who assist them in outsourcing projects. First, outsourcing in other sectors 
has become too commonplace to seriously impair corporate reputations.314 
Second, as Professor Vikramaditya Khanna noted in a recent presentation, 
the American public is less likely to sympathize with the plight of displaced 
lawyers, who are still seen as more privileged than the average worker.315 
Finally, globalization—both in and out of the legal field—is rapidly 
increasing.316 Studies have shown that lower levels of ethnocentrism are 
correlated with more favorable attitudes toward outsourcing.317 Thus, as the 
legal profession continues its transnational growth, it appears likely that 
controversy over legal offshoring and outsourcing will diminish. 
D. Moving Toward Collaboration 
The disaggregation/collaboration dichotomy is ultimately a secondary 
concern to clients in need of legal services. Their primary concerns are that 
the legal services will be rendered cost effectively without sacrificing 
competence, quality, or other ethical duties. Disaggregating the legal 
process by sending some work offshore greatly reduces legal costs, but a 
true disaggregation model also carries enhanced risks of ethical failure. 
Agency theory suggests that residual loss arises when the disparity between 
a principal’s and agent’s interests is not eliminated by contract.318 As 
disaggregation increases the numbers of contracted agents, the risks of such 
residual loss increase. These risks include the possibility that offshore 
employees may breach confidentiality, that disaggregated responsibility will 
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allow crucial tasks to fall through the cracks, or that failure to properly 
supervise the legal process will produce substandard work. 
Moving to a collaborative model can minimize some of these risks. 
Focusing on long-term cooperation and building institutional mechanisms 
to seek feedback from offshore partners can improve the quality of services 
rendered. Offshore employees who are closely involved in the day-to-day 
work are likely to have valuable suggestions for managing risks and 
enhancing quality. Communication is crucial to this endeavor—in addition 
to accepting feedback from offshore partners, clients should also provide 
feedback regarding the success or failure of individual assignments. 
Regardless of whether the offshored work involves high-level research or 
low-level document review, the offshore attorneys will more fully 
understand the context of the work and will feel more invested in the 
process. Finally, outsourcing managers should make efforts to smooth out 
status differences among onshore and offshore employees, avoiding reliance 
on cultural stereotypes, investing economic, intellectual, social, and 
symbolic capital in team members, and assisting with cultural blending. 
There are a number of concrete steps that parties can take to create a 
more collaborative outsourcing environment. First, institutionalized training 
programs can help build collaboration. Unlike single-location firms where 
junior employees may be expected to absorb key information informally, 
outside service providers will almost certainly need to be trained on the 
background and specific needs of the client.319 Formalizing the training 
program may take time at the front end, but it is likely to pay off in greater 
productivity. Institutional training programs are a way of sharing 
intellectual capital through the development of technical skills. Such 
training programs also provide a mechanism for sharing social capital, as 
employees form connections with the more senior people leading the 
training sessions.320 
Second, onshore and offshore partners can engage in employee 
exchanges to deepen personal relationships. Although technology can assist 
in the outsourcing process generally, some amount of face-to-face contact 
may deepen collaboration in ways that technology alone cannot. Pangea3, 
for example, reported that one U.S. client invited an Indian attorney to 
spend several months on-site in the United States; the individuals involved 
in the legal work got to know each other better, and training could be 
provided at the client’s home site.321 
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Third, clients should discuss outsourcing vendors’ internal employment 
practices.322 The conditions under which the individual employees work can 
make a significant difference to the end result. Employees with unmet 
expectations may feel little or no loyalty to the employer, and may be more 
likely to engage in disloyal or opportunistic conduct.323  
Finally, clients hiring offshore legal service providers should work to 
develop a shared understanding of the project at all levels. One legal 
professional suggested that the best way to do this is to “[g]ive the [f]irst 
[a]ssignment to [y]ourself”—that is, for the client to share early on in the 
outsourced work.324 For a document review project, that might mean that 
the client would actually “sit down and code documents [them]self for an 
hour, a day, a week or even a month.”325 Sharing in the work builds a shared 
understanding, as the client would better understand whether the review 
parameters were reasonable, how fast employees could be expected to 
review the documents, and whether additional training was needed.326 Such 
a practice could also smooth status differences, as onshore workers shared 
in the same work performed offshore.327 
CONCLUSION 
International outsourcing is quickly reshaping the practice of law. 
Sending legal services offshore does not merely shift existing legal practice 
to a lower-cost provider. Instead, as in the Ali G case, it can change the 
nature of the services rendered, moving cases from settlement to 
adjudication on the merits and making additional legal services affordable. 
Cost savings from outsourcing may mean that a libel defendant can afford 
to fight a frivolous case rather than submit to a nuisance settlement or that a 
criminal defendant can fully litigate procedural motions and substantive 
defenses.  
While cost difference may drive the initial outsourcing decision, 
however, cost differences alone cannot sustain it in the long run. If 
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offshoring is to be strategically effective as well as cost effective, parties 
must not limit their attention to financial cost alone. Instead, they should be 
aware of other factors that influence the success or failure of the 
outsourcing relationship. Socioeconomic and organizational theories related 
to outsourcing can help predict where risks will arise from differing 
incentives in the contracting process. In addition, understanding the 
situational context of the outsourcing process can help predict risks that 
arise from gaps in the allocation of responsibility or from cultural 
misunderstandings. Once potential risks have been identified, the parties to 
the outsourcing process can take steps to close those gaps and to improve 
compliance with professional duties.  
If legal offshoring is to be a viable and sustainable option, clients should 
not view it as merely disaggregating legal work and sending it to the lowest 
bidder. Parties seeking a successful offshoring practice should instead adopt 
a collaborative model that builds relationships with both onshore and 
offshore legal service providers, working cooperatively with the provider 
best able to complete the projects, maintaining reciprocal communication, 
managing cultural differences, and acknowledging each participant’s 
contribution to the whole. 
